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Corporations today wield unprecedented power in politics and society, and they have a 
tremendous effect on human welfare around the globe. At the same time, they are increasingly 
difficult to regulate. Corporations are savvy and mobile, and they can relocate to avoid burdensome 
domestic regulation with surprising ease. The agility of corporations creates a dilemma for 
government decisionmakers seeking to balance the need to attract the wealth that corporations 
create with the desire to pursue other policy priorities. One approach that governments have used 
to address this dilemma is international cooperation, and a growing number of scholars have 
argued that formal or informal agreements are necessary to solve many of the regulatory problems 
associated with corporate agility. This emphasis on multilateral solutions, however, obscures the 
extent to which countries, and in particular large economic powers, can and do unilaterally impose 
their domestic regulations on international firms. This Article argues that unilateral corporate 
regulation can solve, or at least mitigate, many of the global problems that government 
decisionmakers face. At the same time, a state’s assertion of unilateral regulatory authority in 
any particular issue area is costly and may reduce the effectiveness of regulation in other areas. 
More broadly, it is such a powerful tool that governments must proceed cautiously before utilizing 
it. The Article concludes by providing a framework for designing and implementing unilateral 
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I.  INTRODUCTION  
The modern multinational corporation is larger and more powerful than 
ever.1 Corporations control enormous amounts of cash and other assets, and they 
use these assets to pursue business goals in a diverse array of sectors and 
industries. They also have an increasing ability to relocate to new markets and new 
jurisdictions in order to pursue greater profits. In many ways, this is undoubtedly 
a good thing: it allows them to respond to shifting consumer demand, provide 
products at lower prices, and generate wealth. 
At the same time, the agility of corporations in restructuring and relocating 
presents a problem for governments seeking to regulate corporate behavior. 
Governments may desire to constrain the actions of corporations in a number of 
ways, including taxing their profits, monitoring their employment policies, and 
preventing predatory behavior, but any regulation that imposes costs on 
corporations may cause those corporations to move offshore to jurisdictions that 
do not impose those costs.2 For a current example of the amount of time and 
energy that companies devote to avoiding regulatory costs, one need only consider 
the explosion in recent years of so-called inversion transactions, in which U.S. 
companies buy foreign companies and reincorporate abroad, in some cases 
reducing their tax rates from 35% to 12% or even lower.3 If corporations can 
plausibly threaten to relocate in the face of heavier regulatory burdens, 
                                                 
1  See DAVID J. SIEGEL, ORGANIZING FOR SOCIAL PARTNERSHIP 51 (2010) (arguing that multinational 
corporations rival governments in their reach and power); Steven R. Ratner, Corporations and Human 
Rights: A Theory of Legal Responsibility, 111 YALE L.J. 443, 461–62 (2001) (arguing that modern 
corporations “may have as much or more power over individuals as governments”). 
2  See Joseph Nye, Two Views of World Order, in GLOBAL COMPANIES: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF 
WORLD BUSINESS 165–66 (G. Ball ed., 1975) (arguing that multinational corporations will use their 
mobility to shape or avoid domestic regulations); William J. Carney, The Political Economy of 
Competition for Corporate Charters, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 303 (1997) (discussing the mobility of firms in 
choosing their state of incorporation and the effect on regulatory competition). 
3  See Andrew Ross Sorkin, A Tidal Wave of Corporate Migrants Seeking (Tax) Shelter, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
25, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/26/business/dealbook/a-tidal-wave-of-corporate-
migrants-seeking-tax-shelter.html?_r=0; Shayndi Raice, How Tax Inversions Became the Hottest Trend in 
M&A, WALL ST. J., Aug. 5, 2014, http://www.wsj.com/articles/how-tax-inversions-became-the-
hottest-trend-in-m-a-1407240175; Robert Cyran, Tax Inversions Spinning Out of Control, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 30, 2014, https://perma.cc/X7JX-E8SH. The U.S. government has reacted to the uptick in 
inversion transactions by condemning companies that engage in inversions as “deserters” and 
issuing new rules significantly restricting how and when inversions may be used. See Leslie Picker 
& Michael J. de la Merced, U.S. Moves to Thwart Use of Foreign Inversions as Tax Dodge, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 4, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/05/business/dealbook/us-acts-to-end-use-of-
foreign-acquisitions-to-dodge-taxes.html; John D. McKinnon & Damian Paletta, Obama 
Administration Issues New Rules to Combat Tax Inversions, WALL ST. J., Sept. 22, 2014, 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/treasury-to-unveil-measures-to-combat-tax-inversions-1411421056. 
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governments may be hesitant to enact otherwise beneficial corporate regulations.4 
Regulatory competition between governments might lead to destructive policies, 
as governments attempt to attract the wealth that corporations bring to their 
country.5 
It is a common refrain that these kinds of global problems require global 
solutions. In this view, the increasing mobility of corporations poses regulatory 
dilemmas for national governments that can only be resolved through 
international cooperation.6 If countries agreed to maintain certain tax rates, 
                                                 
4  Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 225, 
226 (1985) (finding that “firms that change their state of incorporation are sensitive to the legal 
regime under which they operate, and differences in the laws play a significant role in their 
decision”); Victor Fleischer, Regulatory Arbitrage, 89 TEX. L. REV. 227, 274–80 (2010) (analyzing the 
effects of regulatory arbitrage on regulatory competition between states). 
5  As Margaret Cole, the former Director of Enforcement at the U.K.’s Financial Services Authority, 
said in 2006, “London’s philosophy of ‘light touch’ regulation has helped it in becoming the world’s 
leading center for mobile capital.” Margaret Cole, The U.K. FSA: Nobody Does It Better, 12 FORDHAM 
J. CORP. & FIN. L. 259, 266–67 (2007). There is a lively debate among scholars about whether 
regulatory competition between countries leads to better or worse regulation—the familiar “race to 
the bottom”-“race to the top” debate. See David Vogel & Robert A. Kagan, Introduction, in 
DYNAMICS OF REGULATORY CHANGE: HOW GLOBALIZATION AFFECTS NATIONAL REGULATORY 
POLICIES 4–5 (David Vogel & Robert A. Kagan eds. 2004) (discussing the literature on the “race to 
the bottom” phenomenon and its opponents); Ratner, supra note 1, at 462 (“[T]he desire of many 
less developed states to welcome foreign investment means that some governments have neither 
the interest nor the resources to monitor corporate behavior, either with respect to the 
[multinational’s] employees or with respect to the broader community.”); William L. Cary, Federalism 
and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 665–66 (1974). But see Ralph K. Winter, 
Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251 (1977) 
(arguing that states with more efficient laws will attract corporations); Frank H. Easterbrook & 
Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J.L. & ECON. 395, 398 (1983) (describing the “power 
of competition among jurisdictions to produce legal doctrines beneficial to shareholders”); Erin A. 
O'Hara & Larry E. Ribstein, From Politics to Efficiency in Choice of Law, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 1151, 1163 
(2000) (“Individuals and firms who have an incentive to minimize their transaction and information 
costs and an ability to choose legal regimes that accomplish this goal over time may cause the law 
to move toward efficiency, if only because inefficient regimes end up governing fewer and fewer 
people and transactions.”). This article will not settle that debate. Instead, it assumes that states in 
some circumstances perceive an interest in regulating companies but are constrained by the need 
to attract corporations to their jurisdictions. 
6  See Joseph E. Stiglitz, Regulating Multinational Corporations: Towards Principles of Cross-Border Legal 
Frameworks in a Globalized World Balancing Rights with Responsibilities, 23 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 451, 547–
48 (2008) (arguing that international agreements are required to improve the regulation of 
multinational corporations globally); Andrew T. Guzman, Choice of Law: New Foundations, 90 GEO. 
L.J. 883, 932 (2002) (arguing that the regulation of multinational corporations to enhance global 
efficiency “requires international cooperation”); RAYMOND VERNON, SOVEREIGNTY AT BAY: THE 
MULTINATIONAL SPREAD OF U.S. ENTERPRISES 271 (1971) (arguing that the clash between 
multinational corporations and governments can only be resolved through international 
harmonization); Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Andrew T. Guzman, An Economic Analysis of Transnational 
Bankruptcies, 42 J.L. & ECON. 775, 780 (1999) (arguing that the inefficiency of territorial bankruptcy 
laws “highlights the need for a reciprocity requirement or, ideally, international treaties on the 
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employee protections or environmental regulations, then corporations could not 
relocate to other jurisdictions in order to avoid those regulations.7 Undesirable 
regulatory competition could be halted. But international cooperation suffers 
from a series of well-known flaws: it is difficult to reach consensus,8 international 
enforcement mechanisms are weak,9 and agreements often have little effect on the 
behavior of the relevant actors.10 For all these reasons, multilateralism is not 
always a good option. 
The reliance on multilateralism as a solution to global problems obscures the 
extent to which states can and do act unilaterally to resolve, or at least mitigate, 
the problems associated with corporate agility. In many cases, unilateral regulation 
                                                 
subject”); NEIL HOOD & STEPHEN YOUNG, THE ECONOMICS OF MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE 
238–39 (1979) (arguing that the most efficient solution to the control of multinational enterprises 
is multilateral regulation). For works in the transnational governmental networks theory, see Anne-
Marie Slaughter, The Real New World Order, 76 FOREIGN AFF. 183, 184–85 (1997) (“[T]oday 
transgovernmentalism is rapidly becoming the most widespread and effective mode of international 
governance.”); Kal Raustiala, The Architecture of International Cooperation: Transgovernmental Networks and 
the Future of International Law, 43 VA. J. INT'L L. 1 (2002); David Zaring, International Law by Other 
Means: The Twilight Existence of International Financial Regulatory Organizations, 33 TEX. INT'L L.J. 281 
(1998); Anu Piilola, Assessing Theories of Global Governance: A Case Study of International Antitrust 
Regulation, 39 STAN. J. INT'L L. 207 (2003). But see Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, National Regulation of 
Multinational Enterprises: An Essay on Comity, Extraterritoriality, and Harmonization, 42 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 5, 18 (2003) (setting forth areas in which harmonization is unnecessary to regulate 
corporations); Detlev F. Vagts, The Governance of the Multinational, 23 WIS. INT’L L.J. 525, 537 (2005) 
(“A worldwide government organization to control multinationals is more or less unthinkable.”); 
Pierre-Hugues Verdier, Transnational Regulatory Networks and Their Limits, 34 YALE J. INT’L L. 113, 
115 (2009) (“[Transgovernmental networks] face several fundamental limitations . . . and, as a result, 
are unlikely to meet the high expectations raised by their advocates.”). 
7  See Philipp Genschel & Thomas Plumper, Regulatory Competition and International Cooperation, 4 J. EUR. 
PUB. POL. 626, 628–31 (1997) (arguing that international cooperation may contribute to upward 
pressure on the level of corporate regulation). 
8  Robert H. Mnookin, Strategic Barriers to Dispute Resolution: A Comparison of Bilateral and Multilateral 
Negotiations, 8 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 15 (2003); William Magnuson, The Domestic Politics of 
International Extradition, 52 VA. J. INT'L L. 839, 873 (2012). 
9  See Anu Bradford & Omri Ben-Shahar, Efficient Enforcement in International Law, 12 CHI. J. INT’L L. 
375, 380–93 (2012) (explaining the fundamental difficulties of enforcing international law); ROBERT 
E. SCOTT & PAUL B. STEPHAN, THE LIMITS OF LEVIATHAN: CONTRACT THEORY AND THE 
ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 110–46 (2006) (describing when states do and do not 
enforce international law). But see Oona Hathaway & Scott J. Shapiro, Outcasting: Enforcement in 
Domestic and International Law, 121 YALE L.J. 252, 307 (2011) (arguing that “outcasting” may serve as 
a useful tool to enforce international law). 
10  See Oona Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make A Difference?, 111 YALE L.J. 1935, 1940 (2002) 
(finding that the ratification of human rights treaties is “not infrequently associated with worse 
human rights ratings than otherwise expected”); Beth A. Simmons, Compliance with International 
Agreements, 1 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 75, 89 (1998); Alan O. Sykes, The (Limited) Role of Regulatory 
Harmonization in International Goods and Services Markets, 2 J. INT’L ECON. L. 49 (1999); DANIEL W. 
DREZNER, ALL POLITICS IS GLOBAL: EXPLAINING INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY REGIMES 12–13 
(2007). 
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by one country can provide robust constraints on corporate behavior abroad. 
Indeed, a number of states now implement and enforce unilateral regulations of 
international business, and these efforts appear to be increasing.11 By asserting 
novel theories of jurisdiction and tweaking the scope and target of their laws, 
states have attempted to reach corporate activity even when the activity occurs 
outside of their borders.12 Unilateral regulation holds the alluring promise of 
offering many of the benefits of multilateral agreement without the costs and 
limitations normally associated with international cooperation.13 If one state acting 
alone can impose sufficient costs on foreign corporations to induce them to 
change their behavior, this approach may be a viable alternative to international 
negotiation.14 
This Article argues that many global problems in corporate law can be 
resolved through unilateral corporate regulation. Section II describes the 
increasing mobility of companies and the concomitant regulatory dilemma that 
governments face. This Section also outlines the maladaptiveness of international 
institutions to solving these problems. Section III explores the phenomenon of 
unilateral corporate regulation as an alternative solution to the harms associated 
with regulatory arbitrage by corporations. This Section explains the conditions 
under which unilateral regulation can be effective and provides a summary of the 
kinds of unilateral regulation countries can adopt. 
Finally, Section IV describes the limitations inherent in unilateral regulation, 
including the potential for harmful regulation to spread across jurisdictions, and 
provides some guidelines for a smarter deployment of this policy tool. The 
implementation of unilateral corporate regulation is costly and may reduce the 
effectiveness of the state’s regulations in other issue areas. In addition, unilateral 
                                                 
11  See William Magnuson, International Corporate Bribery and Unilateral Enforcement, 51 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 360, 399–407 (2013) (describing the increasing use of anti-bribery laws as a unilateral 
enforcement mechanism). 
12  See Jack L. Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1199, 1208 (1998); Magnuson, supra 
note 11. 
13  See Gabriella Blum, Bilateralism, Multilateralism, and the Architecture of International Law, 49 HARV. INT’L 
L.J. 323, 349–54 (2008) (discussing the limitations of multilateralism); Bruno Simma, Consent: Strains 
in the Treaty System, in THE STRUCTURE AND PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 485, 485–94 (R. St. 
J. Macdonald & Douglas M. Johnston eds., 1983) (same); Robert O. Keohane, Reciprocity in 
International Relations, in INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND STATE POWER: ESSAYS IN 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY 132 (Robert O.Keohane ed., 1986), first published in 40 INT’L 
ORG. 1, 1–27 (1986). 
14  See Anu Bradford, The Brussels Effect, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 3 (2012) (arguing that the E.U. has an 
unrivaled “unilateral power to regulate”); Gregory Shaffer, Globalization and Social Protection: The 
Impact of EU and International Rules in the Ratcheting Up of U.S. Privacy Standards, 25 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 
55–80 (2000) (describing how E.U. privacy law has constrained U.S. domestic privacy policies and 
practices). 
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corporate regulation may carry with it a greater risk of over-regulation, harmful 
regulation, and policy conflict between states.15 For these reasons, unilateral 
regulation must be deployed sparingly and with caution. This Section argues that 
unilateral corporate regulation is most likely to be beneficial and effective when 
(1) there is a global consensus on the nature of the problem, (2) the corporate 
behavior at issue imposes strong externalities on other countries, and (3) the 
regulating state adopts the most targeted form of unilateral regulation possible. 
II.  AGILE CORPORATIONS AND THE FAILURE 
OF  MULTILATERALISM  
Corporations today are more mobile than ever—through strategic 
reincorporation, creation of foreign subsidiaries, or other means, corporations can 
take advantage of shifting business conditions worldwide.16 Corporate mobility 
can be quite beneficial for consumers, as it may allow corporations to respond 
better and more quickly to shifting consumer demand. Indeed, it can rightfully be 
described as one of the primary benefits of a modern, globalized world. At the 
same time, corporate mobility creates a problem for governments attempting to 
regulate the behavior of corporations inside and outside their borders. If 
corporations can easily shift operations abroad, they also can evade regulations 
that would otherwise constrain their behavior.17 Corporate mobility may in turn 
lead to regulatory competition between countries, with governments vying to 
adopt the most business-friendly rules in order to attract corporations and the 
benefits associated with them.18 Of course, the ultimate effects of regulatory 
                                                 
15  These concerns are connected with the broader concept of “international comity,” a basic premise 
of foreign relations law. See William S. Dodge, International Comity in American Law, 115 COLUM. L. 
REV. 2071, 2120–24 (2015). 
16  See William W. Bratton, Joseph A. McCahery & Erik P.M. Vermeulen, How Does Corporate Mobility 
Affect Lawmaking? A Comparative Analysis, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 347, 361 (2009) (examining the impact 
of increased corporate mobility in the E.U.); John Armour, Who Should Make Corporate Law? EC 
Legislation Versus Regulatory Competition, 58 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 369 (2005); Jens C. Dammann, 
Freedom of Choice in European Corporate Law, 29 YALE J. INT'L L. 477 (2004); Martin Gelter, The Structure 
of Regulatory Competition in European Corporate Law, 5 J. CORP. L. STUD. 247 (2005). 
17  There is strong evidence that corporations choose their country of incorporation based on 
regulatory costs, including minimum capital requirements and setup costs. See Marco Becht, Colin 
Mayer & Hannes F. Wagner, Where Do Firms Incorporate? Deregulation and the Cost of Entry, 14 J. CORP. 
FIN. 241, 242 (2008); Marco Becht, Colin Mayer & Hannes F. Wagner, Corporate Mobility and the Costs 
of Regulation 7 (Eur. Corp. Gov. Inst.-Working Paper Series in Law, Working Paper No. 70/2006, 
May 2006). Another important area of regulatory arbitrage involves the rights of creditors. See Luca 
Enriques & Martin Gelter, How the Old World Encountered the New One: Regulatory Competition and 
Cooperation in European Corporate and Bankruptcy Law, 81 TUL. L. REV. 577, 612–13 (2007). 
18  Within the U.S., Delaware has been one of the primary beneficiaries of regulatory competition 
between states. Nearly one half of all public companies in the U.S. are incorporated in Delaware, 
and, in 2011, the state collected $860 million in taxes and fees from its absentee corporate residents, 
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competition on welfare, and whether it leads to better or worse law, are a matter 
of some controversy.19 However, where countries perceive that regulatory 
arbitrage by corporations contributes to a “race to the bottom,” or, more simply, 
conflicts with their primary policy goals, governments may wish to prevent 
corporations from engaging in regulatory arbitrage. 
A number of scholars have argued that formal or informal multilateral 
cooperation presents the only real hope for a solution to the problems of 
corporate mobility and regulatory arbitrage.20 By harmonizing and unifying 
regulations across jurisdictions, countries can simultaneously reduce the ability of 
corporations to relocate in order to avoid regulation and lessen concerns about 
harmful regulatory competition between states. 
Multilateralism, however, suffers from a number of important limitations. 
First, the negotiation of multilateral agreements is often a long and difficult 
process, involving a large number of parties and disparate national interests.21 
Second, monitoring of treaty parties’ compliance with their obligations is 
complicated, as incentives to monitor are often low for any individual member 
and the aggregate costs of monitoring can be high.22 Finally, the enforcement of 
multilateral agreements is often weak or nonexistent due to a number of factors, 
including the costs of enforcement and the lack of an authoritative supranational 
institution.23 Due to these structural weaknesses, multilateralism has failed to solve 
the dangers of corporate agility and has led to a search for alternative solutions. 
                                                 
accounting for a quarter of its entire budget. See Leslie Wayne, How Delaware Thrives as a Corporate 
Tax Haven, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2012, at B1, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/01/business/h
ow-delaware-thrives-as-a-corporate-tax-haven.html?_r=0. 
19  A number of scholars have argued that regulatory competition between jurisdictions leads to a “race 
to the top,” and thus causes countries to optimize their laws. See Armour, supra note 16, at 377–78; 
Dammann, supra note 16, at 478. Other scholars have argued that regulatory competition produces 
the opposite effect, a “race to the bottom.” See Ratner, supra note 1, at 462. Still others argue that 
regulatory competition leads to both effects, depending on the particular circumstances. See 
Zsuzsanna Fluck & Colin Mayer, Race to the Top or Bottom? Corporate Governance, Freedom of 
Reincorporation and Competition in Law, 1 ANNALS FIN. 349, 352 (2005). 
20  See generally supra note 6. See Stiglitz, supra note 6, at 547–48. 
21  See Mnookin, supra note 8, at 14–18 (describing the additional complexities associated with multi-
party negotiations); Blum, supra note 13, at 351–54 (describing the inefficiencies of multilateral 
international negotiations). 
22  See Kal Raustiala, Form and Substance in International Agreements, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 581, 582 (2005) 
(arguing that there is often a tradeoff between substantive obligations and the monitoring of those 
obligations). 
23  See id. at 605 (stating that “the international legal system is distinguished by the rarity of courts and 
the weakness of those that exist”); ROBERT O. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND 
DISCORD IN THE WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY 88 (1984) (arguing that, because governments “put 
a high value on the maintenance of their own autonomy, it is usually impossible to establish 
international institutions that exercise authority over states”). 
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A.  Agile Corporations 
Corporations today have an unprecedented ability to adapt to changing 
business conditions. Advances in technology,24 the emergence of multiple capital 
market centers,25 and the flourishing of alternative corporate forms26 have all 
contributed to this phenomenon, giving corporations tremendous flexibility and 
mobility in the face of change. Corporate agility, that is, the ability of corporations 
to reorganize and restructure their operations in reaction to changing business 
conditions, has thus changed the landscape of international business.27 
Corporate agility provides a number of benefits to consumers. Corporations 
that can react quickly to changes in consumer preferences, share information 
across borders, and locate and exploit low-cost resources can create better 
products at lower prices.28 Just as importantly, the relocation of offices and the 
creation of subsidiaries allow corporations to localize their products, providing 
goods that satisfy domestic consumer requirements and tastes faster and more 
efficiently.29 Similarly, alternative corporate forms and structures, such as 
reincorporations or offshore shell companies, can be used for a number of 
legitimate transactional purposes, including smoothing the transfer of assets, 
protecting trade secrets, and avoiding predatory governments.30 
                                                 
24  See Paul Schiff Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 1155, 1159 (2007) (noting the 
“growth of global communications technologies, the rise of multinational corporate entities with 
no significant territorial center of gravity, and the mobility of capital and people across borders”). 
25  See Comm. on Capital Mkts. Regulation, The Competitive Position of the U.S. Public Equity Market 1, 1 
(2007), available at https://perma.cc/BM2P-ELDJ (arguing that the relative attractiveness of non-
U.S. public markets has increased dramatically in recent years). 
26  See They Sell Sea Shells, ECONOMIST, Apr. 7 2012, at 69, https://perma.cc/Z7B4-4AHF (discussing 
the increased use of shell companies by corporations). 
27  This is not to say that relocation is always, or even often, costless. Corporations build factories, buy 
office buildings, and hire workers in their jurisdictions, and transitioning to new jurisdictions can 
involve transaction costs. But the point here is a different one: the cost-benefit analysis in today’s 
world has shifted in favor of mobility. 
28  See Martin Christopher, The Agile Supply Chain: Competing in Volatile Markets, 29 INDUS. MKTG. 
MGMT. 37, 38 (2000); ROBERT H. LOWSON, STRATEGIC OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT: THE NEW 
COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE (2002); ROBERT H. LOWSON, RUSSELL KING & ALAN HUNTER, QUICK 
RESPONSE: MANAGING THE SUPPLY CHAIN TO MEET CONSUMER DEMAND (1999). 
29  See Susan P. Douglas & Yoram Wind, The Myth of Globalization, 22 COLUM. J. WORLD BUS. 19, 27–
28 (1987) (arguing that, given growing internationalization, corporations can often receive greater 
returns through adapting products to the characteristics of individual markets). 
30  See Tim Castelli, Not Guilty By Association: Why the Taint of their Blank Check Predecessors Should Not 
Stunt the Growth of Modern Special Purpose Acquisition Companies, 50 B.C. L. REV. 237 (2009). 
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On the other hand, corporate agility can be used for more nefarious 
purposes. Companies can use offshore shell corporations to evade taxes.31 They 
can move jurisdictions to avoid being subject to environmental laws, consumer 
protection laws, or corruption laws.32 Banks can reincorporate to take advantage 
of laxer capitalization requirements in other countries.33 Companies, therefore, 
can and do use an array of sophisticated strategies to avoid regulatory costs. To 
the extent that countries view these regulations as beneficial, or that the regulated 
activity causes externalities, countries may desire to reduce or prevent regulatory 
arbitrage by their corporations. 
At the same time, regulatory competition between states may prevent states 
from adopting their preferred policies.34 In other words, a state might desire to 
enact regulations to safeguard the financial system or protect the environment,35 
but if these regulations would cause corporations to leave the state’s jurisdiction, 
then government officials might be persuaded to water the regulations down, or 
forego them altogether.36 Similarly, states might adopt progressively lower 
corporate income taxes in order to attract foreign companies.37 Some scholars 
argue that this kind of regulatory competition leads to a beneficial “race to the 
top,” because corporations tend to migrate to jurisdictions that offer efficient 
                                                 
31  In 2006, a bipartisan U.S. Senate report outlined the scope of the problem, describing the variety 
of offshore shell companies and other strategies that corporations used to hide assets and 
transactions from the IRS. Report on Tax Haven Abuses: The Enablers, the Tools and Secrecy, released in 
conjunction with S. Comm. on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Permanent 
Subcomm. on Investigations, August 1, 2006 Hearing (109th Cong.) available at 
https://perma.cc/4CCS-FTPF. 
32  See Magnuson, supra note 11, at 58–59 (arguing that companies may refrain from entering or 
affirmatively leave the U.S. market in order to avoid liability for bribery payments). 
33  See Becht, Mayer & Wagner, supra note 17, at 241 (finding that minimum capital requirements and 
setup costs drive a corporation’s decision where to incorporate). 
34  States derive a number of benefits from incorporations, including greater tax revenue, higher 
employment, and patronage for other companies. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the 
Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1435, 1451 
(1992). 
35  See Kirsten H. Engel, State Environmental Standard-Setting: Is There a “Race” and Is It “To the Bottom”?, 
48 HASTINGS L.J. 271, 351–52 (1997) (arguing that empirical evidence suggests that regulatory 
competition between states with respect to environmental law is detrimental to social welfare). 
36  See Joel P. Trachtman, International Regulatory Competition, Externalization, and Jurisdiction, 34 HARV. 
INT’L L.J. 47, 77 (1993) (noting the multiple policies that states pursue and the constraints imposed 
on them by international regulatory competition). 
37  See Efraim Chalamish, The Future of Bilateral Investment Treaties: A De Facto Multilateral Agreement?, 34 
BROOK. J. INT’L L. 303, 319 (2009) (“Such disruption is evident in international taxation, wherein 
harmful tax competition reduces tax rates and developing countries are forced to sacrifice tax 
revenues in order to join bilateral double-taxation treaties.”). 
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regulations,38 while others argue that, at least in some areas, regulatory competition 
causes states to enact suboptimal policies, either because of capture, agency costs, 
or externalities.39 Regardless of the ultimate effect of regulatory competition on 
social welfare, regulatory competition is clearly an important factor in state 
decisionmaking today. 
For these reasons, the increasing mobility and sophistication of corporations 
present governments with a dilemma. They can enact laws to constrain and limit 
corporate behavior in their borders, but these laws can be evaded if corporations 
reincorporate offshore or shift operations and assets abroad. To the extent that 
states also have an interest in maximizing the number of corporations 
incorporated within their borders,40 they may be forced to abandon corporate 
regulations that impose significant costs on companies. In order to solve this 
dilemma, states have often turned to international agreements, a solution with an 
entirely different set of problems. 
B.  Frail  International Institutions  
States turn to international cooperation to solve a number of international 
problems. They use treaties and other forms of international law to reduce barriers 
to trade, prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, protect human rights, and pursue 
a variety of other important policy goals. Multilateral agreements can serve a useful 
purpose in clarifying the expectations of states and encouraging coordination and 
cooperation between governments.41 By setting down the obligations of states and 
                                                 
38  See Peter Dodd & Richard Leftwich, The Market for Corporate Charters: “Unhealthy Competition” Versus 
Federal Regulation, 53 J. BUS. 259, 260–61 (1980); Frank H. Easterbrook, Managers’ Discretion and 
Investors’ Welfare: Theories and Evidence, 9 DEL. J. CORP. L. 540, 549-50 (1984). The ratcheting up of 
regulation has been described as the “California effect,” due to the role that California has played 
in increasing environmental regulations, including automobile emissions standards, through the 
U.S. See DAVID VOGEL, TRADING UP: CONSUMER AND ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION IN A 
GLOBAL ECONOMY 259 (1995). 
39  See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Allen Ferrell, A New Approach to Takeover Law and Regulatory Competition, 
87 VA. L. REV. 111, 132–35 (2001); Bebchuk, supra note 34, at 1458–96. 
40  For a discussion of whether U.S. states do in fact have such an interest, see Bebchuk, supra note 34, 
at 1451–55. 
41  See Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, International Agreements: A Rational Choice Approach, 44 VA. 
J. INT’L L. 113, 118 (2003) (“The primary purpose of a treaty . . . is to record the actions that count 
as cooperative moves in an ongoing repeated prisoner’s dilemma and similar games involving a 
mixture of cooperation and conflict, and the actions that will count as coordination in coordination 
games.”); Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Customary International Law, 66 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1113, 1138 (1999). 
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the consequences of not complying, treaties can have a significant impact on state 
decisionmaking.42 
Perhaps it is unsurprising, then, that many scholars have posited that global 
corporate law problems require global solutions.43 In areas as diverse as 
bankruptcy,44 securities regulation,45 environmental protection,46 and antitrust,47 
scholars have argued that international cooperation, either through formal treaties 
or through informal government networks, provides the optimal solution to 
corporate regulatory arbitrage. International cooperation can resolve the 
regulatory dilemmas presented by corporate agility by enabling national regulators 
to credibly commit to harmonized regulatory frameworks. As long as a sufficient 
number of countries agree to abide by these rules, the space for regulatory 
competition can be restrained. 
And in fact, states have long been drawn to multilateralism to solve 
cooperation problems associated with corporate regulatory arbitrage.48 To provide 
                                                 
42  See Andrew T. Guzman, The Design of International Agreements, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 579, 588–89 (2005) 
(arguing that treaties affect state decisionmaking by increasing the costs of violations); Harold 
Hongju Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181, 203–05 (1996) (arguing that treaties 
affect state decisionmaking by causing domestic institutions to internalize treaty norms). 
43  See Stiglitz, supra note 6, at 547 (arguing that international agreements are required to improve the 
regulation of multinational corporations globally); Guzman, supra note 6, at 932 (arguing that the 
regulation of multinational corporations often “requires international cooperation”); VERNON, supra 
note 6 (arguing that the clash between multinational corporations and governments can only be 
resolved through international harmonization); Bebchuk & Guzman, supra note 6, at 780 (arguing 
that the inefficiency of territorial bankruptcy laws “highlights the need for a reciprocity requirement 
or, ideally, international treaties on the subject”); HOOD & YOUNG, supra note 6, at 238–39 (arguing 
that the most efficient solution to the control of multinational enterprises is multilateral regulation); 
Vagts, supra note 6, at 537 (“[I]ndividual governments are not well-positioned to cope with 
multinationals because they are too large and diverse to easily yield to regulation, and they are mobile 
enough to slip away when one country’s prosecutors or tax collectors become too inquisitive.”); 
Jonathan R. Macey, Regulatory Globalization as a Response to Regulatory Competition, 52 EMORY L.J. 1353, 
1353 (2003) (“[T]he trend toward regulatory globalization reflects a basic survival response on the 
part of bureaucrats whose regulatory power is threatened by increased competition and private-
sector globalization.”). 
44  See Jay Lawrence Westbrook, A Global Solution to Multinational Default, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2276, 2277 
(2000) (“Universalism—administration of multinational insolvencies by a leading court applying a 
single bankruptcy law—is necessarily the correct long-term solution.”). 
45  See Uri Geiger, The Case for the Harmonization of Securities Disclosure Rules in the Global Market, 1997 
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 241, 297–316 (1997) (exploring the “factors that make the harmonization of 
securities disclosure rules superior to regulatory competition”). 
46  See Jonathan B. Wiener, Think Globally, Act Globally: The Limits of Local Climate Policies, 155 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1961, 1964 (2007) (arguing that the policy challenge of climate change requires policymakers 
to “think globally, act globally”). 
47  See Andrew T. Guzman, Is International Antitrust Possible?, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1501 (1998). 
48  Indeed, there have been sporadic calls for an international treaty on multinational corporations, but 
they have mostly led to soft-law guidelines on the treatment of multinational enterprises. Prominent 
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just one example, in 1987, states agreed to adopt uniform risk-based capital 
requirements on banks under the aegis of the Basel Accord in order to avoid 
systemic risk to the financial system and to prop up the eroding power of 
regulators.49 The fear was that differences between nations with regard to capital 
requirements for banks—that is, the amount of capital that banks must have in 
liquid assets to cover withdrawals and losses—could give banks from some 
countries an advantage over banks from others.50 These differences put pressure 
on domestic regulators to lower capital requirements in their own counties in 
order to attract banks, even at the cost of an increasingly unstable financial 
system.51 Through the Basel Accord, central bankers agreed to refrain from such 
regulatory competition and maintain certain minimum capital requirements.52 The 
Basel Accord has led to two follow-up regulatory frameworks, Basel II and Basel 
III, to update the recommendations and impose more robust regulations on 
international banks.53 
Despite the appeal of multilateralism as a solution to collective action 
problems in corporate law, international cooperation suffers from well-known 
limitations. First, it is notoriously difficult to negotiate and agree on the substance 
                                                 
examples include the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, the ILO Tripartite 
Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy, and the UN 
Global Compact. See DETLEV F. VAGTS, WILLIAM S. DODGE & HAROLD HONGJU KOH, 
TRANSNATIONAL BUSINESS PROBLEMS 199 (2008). 
49  Although the Basel Accords are not formally binding, most member countries implement its 
recommendations. See Ethan B. Kapstein, Resolving the Regulator’s Dilemma: International Coordination of 
Banking Regulations, 43 INT’L ORG. 323, 331–32 (1989); Thomas Oatley & Robert Nabors, 
Redistributive Cooperation: Market Failure, Wealth Transfers, and the Basle Accord, 52 INT’L ORG. 35, 35 
(1998). 
50  See Kapstein, supra note 49, at 326–27. 
51  Kapstein has described the strategic situation of governments before the Basel Accords as follows: 
The rapid changes in capital markets have left regulators wondering if 
international banking is a disaster waiting to happen. Domestic regulators feel 
trapped: if they impose regulatory “costs” on financial firms that other countries 
fail to impose, they make their institutions less competitive in the world 
marketplace. The regulations already make it more difficult to attract domestic 
and foreign investment in financial services; however, the failure to impose 
prudent regulations could open the door to uncontrollable systemic risks. 
 Id. at 326–27. 
52  See Oatley & Nabors, supra note 49, at 35. 
53  Anne-Marie Slaughter uses the Basel Accords as an example of cooperative government networks, 
what she calls “the new world order.” ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 42–43 
(2004). The Basel Accords are often viewed as an example of multilateralism that works: an 
international problem was identified, countries came together to negotiate a treaty, and the treaty 
changed the behavior of the relevant actors. But as will be discussed below, there are reasons to 
doubt that multilateralism can always serve as such an effective response to global corporate harms. 
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of cooperative norms.54 By their very nature, multilateral agreements require the 
consent of multiple parties, each with different interests and different domestic 
politics.55 An increase in the number of participating parties generally decreases 
the area of potential agreement and thus reduces the likelihood of a negotiated 
agreement being reached.56 At the same time, international negotiations involve 
two-level games, in which each party is negotiating with the other parties, but also 
with domestic groups at home.57 The U.S., for example, requires treaties to be 
ratified by the Senate. If domestic groups have different interests than those of 
the negotiating actor, the probability of bargaining failure increases yet again. 
Furthermore, the negotiating party itself can change during the duration of 
negotiations, as countries elect new governments and appoint new foreign 
officials.58 
Second, the monitoring of compliance with cooperative arrangements is 
often problematic.59 If states cannot monitor the behavior of other states and 
identify violations of obligations, the incentives for states to comply with their 
obligations decreases. But as the number of parties to an agreement increases, a 
                                                 
54  See James D. Morrow, Modeling the Forms of International Cooperation: Distribution Versus Information, 48 
INT’L ORG. 387 (1994) (discussing distributional and informational problems involved in 
international negotiations); James D. Fearon, Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation, 52 
INT’L ORG. 269 (1998) (discussing the interrelated nature of bargaining and enforcement issues in 
international negotiations); Michael J. Gilligan, Is There a Broader-Deeper Trade-off in International 
Negotiations?, 58 INT’L ORG. 459 (2004) (discussing the process of creating multilateral agreements). 
55  See James K. Sebenius, Negotiation Arithmetic: Adding and Subtracting Issues and Parties, 37 INT’L ORG. 
281, 308 (1983) (arguing that the greater the number of parties to negotiations, “the higher the 
costs, the longer the time, and the greater the informational requirements for a negotiated 
settlement”); Barbara Koremenos, Contracting around International Uncertainty, 99 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 
549, 554 (2005) (“[I]ncreasing the number of actors involved is likely to make the negotiation 
process lengthier given the existence of multiple equilibria.”). 
56  See Mnookin, supra note 8, at 15–16 (explaining why a unanimity rule in multilateral negotiations 
can impede agreements); See Nicole Simonelli, Bargaining Over International Multilateral Agreements: The 
Duration of Negotiations, 37 INT’L INTERACTIONS 147, 165 (2011) (finding that an increase in the 
number of negotiating states leads to longer negotiations). It should be noted, however, that an 
increase in the number of negotiating parties may also increase the potential area for linkage, that 
is, an exchange of benefits in different policy areas. 
57  See Robert D. Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games, 42 INT’L ORG. 
427 (1988); I.M. DESTLER, AMERICAN TRADE POLITICS: SYSTEM UNDER STRESS 111–14 (4th ed. 
2005). 
58  Rachel Brewster, Unpacking the State’s Reputation, 50 HARV. INT’L L.J. 231, 250–54 (2009) (discussing 
the fluctuating interests of government officials with respect to international law). 
59  See Guzman, supra note 42, at 581 (arguing that, in multilateral agreements, “mechanisms for 
monitoring and review are often weak or non-existent”); Kal Raustiala, Police Patrols & Fire Alarms 
in the NAAEC, 26 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 389, 393 (2004) (discussing the mechanisms 
that states use to monitor treaty compliance). 
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state’s ability to monitor the behavior of its partners decreases.60 While it may be 
easy for states to determine whether other states are imposing tariffs on imports, 
it is much harder to determine whether other states are adequately enforcing their 
corruption laws61 or reducing greenhouse gas emissions.62 Effective monitoring in 
some areas might require intrusive policing and reporting obligations.63 These 
sorts of monitoring issues are deeply sensitive in a world of sovereign states. 
Finally, multilateral agreements suffer from significant enforcement 
problems.64 There is no supranational institution with general powers to adjudicate 
disputes between nations and punish transgressors, so states must rely for the 
most part on self-enforcement mechanisms to ensure compliance with 
international agreements.65 But the imposition of sanctions is often quite costly 
for the states imposing the sanctions, not just for the state that is receiving the 
sanctions.66 The high cost of enforcement disincentivizes states from sanctioning 
                                                 
60  See Blum, supra note 13, at 371–72 (arguing that bilateral agreements allow more effective 
monitoring of practices than multilateral agreements). Of course, the incentives of particular 
domestic actors may differ from the incentives of the state as a whole. See Ronald B. Mitchell, Sources 
of Transparency: Information Systems in International Regimes, 42 INT’L STUD. Q. 109, 120 (1998) (“Even 
corporate actors may have strong incentives to monitor and report on treaty-relevant behavior. Any 
company that chooses or is compelled to comply with a particular regulatory regime has strong 
incentives to monitor to ensure that their competitors are also complying.”). 
61  See Magnuson, supra note 11, at 374–75 (discussing the difficulties of monitoring international anti-
corruption agreements). 
62  See Peter J. Wilcoxen & Warwick J. McKibbin, A Better Way to Slow Global Climate Change 1–8, Policy 
Brief #17 (Brookings Institute, 1997), available at http://perma.cc/D5FV-DTUP (arguing that an 
international climate change treaty with tradable emissions permits would be difficult and expensive 
to monitor). 
63  The controversial issue of nuclear monitors in Iran is just one example of how reticent countries 
are to allow intrusive monitoring of their actions. See Steven Erlanger, Iran Nears Deal on Inspecting 
Atomic Site, U.N. Chief Says, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2012 at A1, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/23/world/middleeast/un-nuclear-monitor-strikes-deal-with-
iran-reports-say.html?_r=0. 
64  See Guzman, supra note 42, at 589 (“The standard enforcement tools of international law are . . . a 
great deal weaker than those present in domestic systems.”). 
65  See Lori Fisler Damrosch, Enforcing International Law Through Non-Forcible Measures, 269 RECUEIL DES 
COURS 9, 19 (1997) (“A fundamental (and frequent) criticism of international law is the weakness 
of mechanisms for enforcement.”); Guzman, supra note 42, at 580–81 (“States cannot write 
enforceable promises in the same way as private parties, but one would expect them to use the tools 
at their disposal to make their agreements more, rather than less, credible. Yet states do not do so.”) 
Of course, some international institutions, such as the WTO, have tribunals to adjudicate disputes. 
These tribunals, however, have limited jurisdiction to hear disputes and a limited ability to enforce 
sanctions on parties. 
66  Monetary sanctions could in some circumstances fully compensate an injured party, but they are 
rarely included in multilateral agreements. See Andrew T. Guzman, The Cost of Credibility: Explaining 
Resistance to Interstate Dispute Resolution Mechanisms, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 303, 304 & n. 3 (2002). 
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acts of non-compliance. Thus, the sanctions for violating obligations under 
multilateral treaties are often weak or nonexistent.67 Similar critiques can apply to 
transgovernmental networks.68 Without a credible threat of sanctions, multilateral 
agreements may lack the ability to influence the behavior of states in a strong 
way.69 
Thus, multilateral agreements are difficult to negotiate, monitor, and 
enforce. Furthermore, these difficulties interact with each other, as the 
enforcement problem may make states less willing to negotiate costly international 
agreements, and the monitoring problem may reduce states’ interest in 
establishing strong sanctions for non-compliance.70 For these reasons, 
multilateralism is not always an attractive option for states attempting to solve 
collective action problems.71 
                                                 
Reputational sanctions, on the other hand, are a net loss for the parties. See Guzman, supra note 42, 
at 595–96. 
67  For example, the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Understanding authorizes states to suspend trade 
concessions with respect to goods from the non-compliant state, but only to offset ongoing 
violations, not to compensate for previous violations. See Rachel Brewster, Shadow Unilateralism: 
Enforcing International Trade Law at the WTO, 30 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 1133, 1134 (2009); William J. Davey, 
Sanctions in the WTO: Problems and Solutions, in THE LAW, ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF RETALIATION 
IN WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 360, 367 (Chad P. Bown & Joost Pauwelyn eds., 2010). Just as 
importantly, the suspension of concessions is costly both for the sanctioned state and the sanctioning 
state. See Guzman, supra note 42, at 595. For a discussion of costly sanctions in the domestic context, 
see Steven Shavell, Criminal Law and the Optimal Use of Nonmonetary Sanctions as a Deterrent, 85 COLUM 
L. REV 1232 (1985); A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Optimal Use of Fines and Imprisonment, 
24 J. PUB. ECON. 89 (1984); Louis Kaplow, A Note on the Optimal Use of Nonmonetary Sanctions, 42 J. 
PUB. ECON. 245 (1990). 
68  See Verdier, supra note 6, at 115. 
69  There is a large literature discussing the ways in which international agreements can affect state 
behavior even in the absence of explicit sanctions. For example, constructivist theories focus on 
the ways that countries internalize international law in a way that promotes obedience. See Andrew 
T. F. Lang, Reconstructing Embedded Liberalism: John Gerard Ruggie and Constructivist Approaches to the Study 
of the International Trade Regime, 9 J. INT'L ECON. L. 81 (2006); Koh, supra note 42; Harold Hongju 
Koh, The 1998 Frankel Lecture: Bringing International Law Home, 35 HOUS. L. REV. 623 (1998); 
Magnuson, supra note 8. But at the very least, the lack of credible sanctions for non-compliance 
with most international agreements raises problematic questions about the mechanisms for how 
these instruments influence state behavior. 
70  See Raustiala, supra note 22, at 582 (arguing that “the widespread preference for contracts often 
unduly weakens the substance and structure of multilateral agreements when states are uncertain 
about compliance costs” and that “[s]tates often compensate for the risk of their own 
noncompliance by weakening monitoring or watering down commitments”). 
71  See Anu Bradford, International Antitrust Negotiations and the False Hope of the WTO, 48 HARV. INT’L 
L.J. 383, 397–400 (2007) (attempting to explain why states have failed to reach agreement on an 
international anti-trust regime). 
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C. The Failure of Multilateralism: Tax Havens,  Mo ney 
Launderers, and Regulatory Deserts  
The structural constraints on multilateralism have tended to undercut efforts 
to solve the problems of corporate agility. In numerous areas, countries have 
attempted to reach international agreement on widely applicable corporate 
regulations in order to bind each other to enforceable standards for corporate 
behavior. These efforts have often resulted in either stalled negotiations or weak 
levels of cooperation, and corporate regulatory arbitrage remains an ever-present 
phenomenon. Although examples abound, this Section will focus on a few 
particularly enlightening cases. 
One important area of potential corporate regulatory competition between 
countries is taxation.72 Countries with low rates of taxation are, perhaps obviously, 
attractive to corporations because, all else equal, they allow corporations to retain 
more of their profits. But countries also depend on corporate taxation for 
government revenue, and if countries compete vigorously on corporate tax rates, 
they can end up undercutting this important revenue source.73 This competitive 
dynamic has been exacerbated by the increasing mobility of capital, which allows 
companies to operate on a global basis from headquarters in the Cayman Islands 
or the Seychelles, countries recognized as tax havens.74 In the 1990s, the 
                                                 
72  See OECD, HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION: AN EMERGING GLOBAL ISSUE (1998); Reuven S. Avi-
Yonah, Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare State, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1573 
(2000). 
73  Tax havens may also create a number of externalities that affect other countries. For example, some 
scholars have argued that tax havens increase the likelihood of financial crises and may facilitate 
money laundering. See Luca Errico & Alberto Musalem, Offshore Banking: An Analysis of Micro- and 
Macro-Prudential Issues, IMF Working Paper, 99/5 (1999), available at https://perma.cc/X5RD-
U7M9; Donato Masciandaro, Offshore Financial Centres: The Political Economy of Regulation, 26 EUR. J. 
L. & ECON. 307, 310 (2008). On the other hand, some scholars have argued that tax havens may be 
beneficial, by allowing corporations to move to jurisdictions that have the optimal balance of tax 
and government services. See J.C. SHARMAN, HAVENS IN A STORM: THE STRUGGLE FOR GLOBAL 
TAX REGULATION 24 (2006). 
74  See OECD, supra note 72, at 13 (“The decision to have a high rate of tax and a high level of 
government spending or low taxes and limited public outlays, the mix of direct and indirect taxes, 
and the use of tax incentives, were all matters which [historically] were decided primarily on the 
basis of domestic concerns and had principally domestic effects.”). The OECD has identified four 
factors for determining whether a country is a tax haven: 
The necessary starting point to identify a tax haven is to ask (a) whether a 
jurisdiction imposes no or only nominal taxes . . . and offers itself, or is 
perceived to offer itself, as a place to be used by non-residents to escape tax in 
their country of residence. Other key factors which can confirm the existence 
of a tax haven . . . are: (b) laws or administrative practices which prevent the 
effective exchange of relevant information with other governments on taxpayers 
benefiting from the low or no tax jurisdiction; (c) lack of transparency and (d) 
the absence of a requirement that the activity be substantial, since it would 
suggest that a jurisdiction may be attempting to attract investment or 
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Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) began to 
spearhead efforts to harmonize international tax laws and prevent harmful tax 
competition.75 However, despite strong support for a multilateral agreement by 
many countries, the efforts to conclude a binding multilateral tax treaty were 
stymied by the complexities of multilateral negotiations.76 The OECD ended up 
publishing non-binding recommendations on tax cooperation that states could, 
but need not, adopt. In addition, the OECD began to compile and publicize a list 
of jurisdictions considered to be tax havens.77 Frustrated by the lack of progress 
in international negotiations, most countries, including the U.S., now focus their 
efforts on concluding bilateral tax treaties with other jurisdictions.78 Government 
revenues lost to tax havens continue to be enormous, with some estimates as high 
as $255 billion per year.79 
Another related area of corporate law that has been undercut by the failure 
to reach international consensus is the prevention of money laundering.80 Money 
laundering refers to any of a variety of tactics that entities use to disguise the 
                                                 
transactions that are purely tax driven (transactions may be booked there 
without the requirement of adding value so that there is little real activity, i.e. 
these jurisdictions are essentially “booking centres”). 
 OECD, supra note 72, at 22. See also Dhammika Dharmapala & James R. Hines, Jr., Which Countries 
Become Tax Havens?, 7 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 12802, 2009), available 
at https://perma.cc/89V6-5L5Y (discussing the reasons why countries become tax havens and 
noting that countries that are tax havens are more likely to be affluent than countries that are not 
tax havens). 
75  See OECD, supra note 72, at 7–12. 
76  Perhaps the primary difficulty in achieving consensus was that “tax haven” jurisdictions saw little 
benefit from adopting tax reforms. As one Caribbean banking official stated, “It’s hard to believe 
that a report that calls for your extermination is a reasonable proposition.” See SHARMAN, supra note 
73, at 121 (quoting Interview with Anonymous Caribbean Official, in Commonwealth, Sydney, 
Austl. (Oct. 30, 2002)). See also Diane M. Ring, Prospects for a Multilateral Tax Treaty, 26 BROOK. J. 
INT’L L. 1699 (2001); Victor Thuronyi, International Tax Cooperation and a Multilateral Treaty, 26 
BROOK. J. INT'L L. 1640 (2001). 
77  See OECD, supra note 72, at 43–44, 52–53. 
78  The success of bilateral treaties has been mixed. See Charles H. Gustafson, The Role of International 
Law and Practice in Addressing International Tax Issues in the Global Era, 56 VILL. L. REV. 475, 480–92 
(2011) (discussing the shift to bilateralism in tax cooperation). 
79  RONEN PALAN, RICHARD MURPHY, & CHRISTIAN CHAVAGNEUX, TAX HAVENS: HOW 
GLOBALIZATION REALLY WORKS 63 (2010). As much as 16% of the world’s financial assets may 
be hidden in offshore accounts. See Adam Davidson, My Big Fat Belizean, Singaporean Bank Account, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 2012, at MM14, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/29/magazin
e/my-big-fat-belizean-singaporean-bank-account.html. 
80  It should be noted that some scholars have argued that tax evasion and money laundering are 
complements. See Beth A. Simmons, The International Politics of Harmonization: The Case of Capital 
Market Regulation, 55 INT’L ORG. 589, 606 (2001). 
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(usually illegal) source of income.81 For example, corporations attempt to hide 
profits from prohibited transactions with sanctioned states, such as Iraq or 
Libya.82 Even more worrisome, terrorist organizations use money laundering to 
fund their operations.83 Because money laundering allows entities to evade 
government regulations, countries expend enormous resources in attempting to 
prevent it.84 With the rise of international banking, however, the ease of money 
laundering has increased exponentially in recent decades. 
Countries have long attempted to increase international cooperation in 
preventing money laundering, and these efforts have met with varying degrees of 
success. The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) was created in 1989 by the G-
7 to investigate international money laundering and provide recommendations for 
improvement.85 FATF also publishes a list of non-cooperative jurisdictions, much 
as the OECD publishes a list of tax havens.86 But again, efforts to reach a binding 
multilateral agreement on financial transparency to prevent money laundering, 
even with strong support from the U.S. and France, faltered, at least partially 
because of the perception that the cost of implementing such measures would fall 
primarily on small, “offshore” centers while the majority of the benefits would 
                                                 
81  See President's Commission on Organized Crime, Interim Report to the President and Attorney 
General, The Cash Connection: Organized Crime, Financial Institutions, and Money Laundering 7 (1984) 
(defining money laundering as “the process by which one conceals the existence, illegal source, or 
illegal application of income, and then disguises that income to make it appear legitimate”). 
82  See Lucinda A. Low, Owen Bonheimer, & Negar Katirai, Enforcement of the FCPA in the United States: 
Trends and the Effects of International Standards, in THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 2008: 
COPING WITH HEIGHTENED ENFORCEMENT RISKS at 784 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice, Course 
Handbook Series No. 13908, 2008), WL 1665 PLI/CORP 711 (describing a suit against BNP 
Paribas, the French bank, for violating money laundering statutes in connection with kickbacks 
from the U.N. Oil-For-Food scandal). 
83  Indeed, one of the cornerstones of the USA PATRIOT Act’s provisions to combat terrorist 
financing was an attempt to force banks to monitor and prevent money laundering. See Eric J. 
Gouvin, Bringing Out the Big Guns: The USA PATRIOT Act, Money Laundering, and the War on Terrorism, 
55 BAYLOR L. REV. 955, 970 (2003). 
84  Money laundering regulations also impose significant costs on the financial institutions responsible 
for enforcing these regulations. See Deborah Ball & Cassell Bryan-Low, U.S. Banks Oppose Tighter 
Money Rules, WALL. ST. J., Mar. 20, 2011, at C2, available at http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000
1424052748704355304576214852895407540. 
85  See Richard K. Gordon, On the Use and Abuse of Standards for Law: Global Governance and Offshore 
Financial Centers, 88 N.C. L. REV. 501, 565–66 (2010). 
86  See, for example, Fin. Action Task Force, Report on Non-Cooperative Countries and Territories 1–2 (2000), 
available at https://perma.cc/A7NJ-ET6Y. The purpose of these lists is to “name and shame” the 
countries that refuse to abide by international norms on money laundering. Although no formal 
sanctions are levied by the FATF, both private and public institutions may use these lists for their 
own countermeasures. See Nicholas W. Turner, The Financial Action Task Force: International Regulatory 
Convergence Through Soft Law, 59 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 547, 554–55 (2015). 
Chicago Journal of International Law 
 540 Vol. 17 No. 2 
accrue to onshore jurisdictions.87 Negotiations were unable to overcome these 
difficulties. Today, even some wealthy, democratic governments, such as 
Switzerland, have been accused of undercutting the regime.88 Recent revelations 
about widespread money laundering involving several large banks only contribute 
to the perception that multilateral mechanisms are ineffectual.89 
In extreme cases, regulatory competition by states, combined with weak 
governmental structures in some less-developed countries, can lead to states 
largely abstaining from any form of regulation over certain powerful corporations 
within their borders.90 These “regulatory deserts” can be quite attractive to certain 
kinds of companies—for example, those that rely heavily on cheap labor and do 
not depend on networks of other well-regulated businesses. Freeport-McMoran, 
a mining company, exercised effective control over certain areas of Irian Jaya, now 
Indonesia, during the 1990s, and Texaco did much the same in the Colombian 
rainforest.91 While regulatory deserts might also be explained as simply a failure of 
governance, not a failure of international cooperation, they have wider effects on 
global business, as multinational corporations today compete with other 
multinational corporations. To the extent that corporations can relocate activities 
and resources to jurisdictions with little or no regulatory burdens, they can gain a 
competitive advantage over their more heavily regulated competitors. 
As this discussion illustrates, states have become increasingly aware of the 
difficulties of regulating multinational corporations in an era of capital mobility. 
While they have often attempted to resolve these difficulties by turning to 
multilateralism, multilateralism is not a panacea and often fails to achieve the goals 
of its participants. The failure of multilateralism as a response to corporate agility 
has led to a search for alternatives capable of solving the problems associated with 
corporate agility. 
III.  THE PROMISES AND PERILS OF UNILATERAL REGULATION  
Corporate agility presents a problem for countries. Governments have an 
                                                 
87  See Gordon, supra note 85, at 569; Richard K. Gordon, Anti-Money-Laundering Policies: Selected Legal, 
Political, and Economic Issues, in 1 CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN MONETARY AND FINANCIAL LAW 405, 
413–14 (1999). 
88  See Jean-Michel Berthoud, Secrecy Hampers Money Laundering Fight, SWISSINFO.CH, Jan. 30, 2012, 
available at https://perma.cc/S53B-UTR2. 
89  See Jill Treanor and Dominic Rushe, HSBC Pays Record $1.9 Billion Fine to Settle US Money-Laundering 
Accusations, THE GUARDIAN, Dec. 11, 2012, available at https://perma.cc/A2F8-MXFD; Danielle 
Douglas, France’s BNP Paribas to Pay $8.9 Billion to U.S. for Sanctions Violations, WASHINGTON POST, 
June 30, 2014 available at https://perma.cc/K6ZD-WW96. 
90  See Ratner, supra note 1, at 462–63 (arguing that some less-developed states have no interest in 
monitoring corporate behavior in their borders). 
91  See id. at 462; Michael C. Howard, Mining, Development, and Indigenous Peoples in Southeast Asia, 22 J. 
BUS. ADMIN. 93 (1994). 
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interest in regulating the activities of corporations within their borders, but they 
also have an interest in the success of those corporations. Successful corporations 
are engines of growth in an economy, and they can create great wealth for society 
at large. Thus, government regulation must strike a balance between imposing 
appropriate regulatory burdens on corporations and ensuring that those 
corporations thrive and prosper. If a government enacts a law that is too costly 
for domestic corporations, those corporations will either move abroad, if possible, 
or fail, if not. 
But suppose that a state does want to enact a regulation—for example, 
imposing criminal liability on corporations for bribing foreign officials—that will 
impose significant costs on domestic corporations. And suppose further that this 
regulation, if imposed solely on domestic corporations, will give foreign 
corporations a competitive advantage. A state could turn to international 
negotiations and attempt to convince other countries to adopt similar rules, 
thereby negating any advantages that foreign corporations might receive from a 
unilateral regulation. But, as noted in the previous Section, multilateralism is often 
difficult to achieve. 
An alternative approach is for a state to impose similar regulatory costs, 
either directly or indirectly, on the foreign corporations unilaterally.92 If a state can 
cause foreign companies to comply with its regulations, either by bringing 
litigation against them, putting pressure on their home country, or taxing their 
products, then corporate agility becomes less problematic. Companies can 
relocate and restructure, but as long as the regulating state can continue to impose 
costs on them, the possibilities for regulatory arbitrage are reduced. 
Unilateral regulation, however, is not always possible. It depends on at least 
two conditions being met: first, the regulating state must have the political will to 
regulate foreign corporations; and second, it must have sufficient power to impose 
costs, either directly or indirectly, on those corporations. Each of these criteria is 
essential to a successful assertion of unilateral regulation. This Section will 
examine these criteria and provide a typology of the kinds of unilateral regulation 
that states use to regulate multinational corporations. It will sketch out some 
preliminary arguments about these categories and discuss the factors that states 
must take into account when deciding whether to adopt unilateral regulations. It 
will argue that, in some areas, unilateralism provides a partial solution to global 
corporate problems. 
                                                 
92  Daniel W. Drezner, Globalization, Harmonization, and Competition: The Different Pathways to Policy 
Convergence, 12 J. EUR. PUB. POL. 841, 841–859 (2005); Beth Simmons, The International Politics of 
Harmonization: The Case of Capital Market Regulation, in DYNAMICS OF REGULATORY CHANGE: HOW 
GLOBALIZATION AFFECTS NATIONAL REGULATORY POLICIES 42, 50–52 (David Vogel & Robert A. 
Kagan eds. 2004); Bradford, supra note 14, at 1. 
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A.  When is Unilateral  Regulation Possible? 
Before examining the varieties of unilateral regulation, a preliminary question 
must be addressed: when can we expect unilateral regulation to occur?93 Not all 
problems can be addressed through unilateral action, and not all countries are 
willing to adopt the policies necessary to make unilateral regulation effective. This 
Section posits that unilateral regulation requires that (1) the regulating state has 
the political will to assert regulatory authority over corporations operating abroad, 
and (2) the regulating state has the ability to impose costs on such corporations. 
1. Political will. 
Unilateral corporate regulation can only occur when a state perceives an 
interest in regulating the subject corporation or behavior.94 The question here is 
whether a single state, acting alone, believes that it will receive sufficient benefits 
from unilateral regulation such that the benefits will offset the costs of enacting 
and enforcing the regulation.95 If a state’s unilateral regulation will destroy 
domestic industries or significantly reduce the attractiveness of its capital markets, 
the state may decide that the costs of regulation outweigh the benefits. It should 
be noted, however, that if government decisionmaking is skewed by capture, 
corruption, or other distortions, the decision to regulate could be made on other, 
less rational grounds.96 
                                                 
93  See Joel P. Trachtman, Unilateralism, Bilateralism, Regionalism, Multilateralism, and Functionalism: A 
Comparison with Reference to Securities Regulation, 4 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 69, 110 (1994) 
(arguing that, “[a]s a temporal matter, unilateral initiatives might be expected to precede bilateral, 
regional, or multilateral initiatives, or to succeed the breakdown of such initiatives”). 
94  Of course, the concept of a “state interest” is complex and controversial. See Jack L. Goldsmith & 
Eric A. Posner, Moral and Legal Rhetoric in International Relations: A Rational Choice Perspective, 31 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 115, 129–31 (2002). At the simplest level, a state has an interest in acting in a certain 
way if the benefits offset the costs. But what benefits should be considered benefits? And how do 
we calculate these benefits? These are perennial problems, and they are only magnified at the 
international level, where domestic actors at various levels have differing assessments of costs and 
benefits. It is sufficient for our purposes that states have interests, or at least preferences, with regard 
to law. 
95  See Duncan Snidal, The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory, 39 INT’L ORG. 579 (1985); CHARLES 
KINDLEBERGER, THE WORLD IN DEPRESSION, 1929–1939 (1973); Charles Kindleberger, Systems of 
International Economic Organization, in MONEY AND THE COMING WORLD ORDER (David Calleo, ed. 
1976); KEOHANE, supra note 23. 
96  For a classic analysis of how collective action problems skew government decisionmaking, see 
MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF 
GROUPS (1965). See also Kay Lehman Schlozman & John T. Tierney, ORGANIZED INTERESTS AND 
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 123–24 (1986); Sam Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 
19 J.L. & ECON. 211 (1976); George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & 
MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971); MICHAEL JOHNSTON, SYNDROMES OF CORRUPTION: WEALTH, POWER, AND 
DEMOCRACY 71–72 (2005); Bebchuk, supra note 33, at 1459-61; Richard L. Hasen, Lobbying, Rent-
Seeking, and the Constitution, 64 STAN. L. REV. 191, 226–36 (2012). 
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To begin, then, a state must see benefits from regulating international 
corporations. In other words, the regulation must create benefits for the regulating 
state, either by advantaging domestic groups, increasing revenue, or prohibiting 
practices harmful to the country. These benefits need not be purely monetary. 
States have demonstrated interests in promoting human rights97 and corporate 
social responsibility abroad.98 Large states, as opposed to small states, are more 
likely to perceive a benefit from unilateral regulation, as they can internalize a 
greater portion of the benefits from regulation.99 Similarly, if the behavior of 
foreign corporations affects the interests of powerful domestic interest groups, 
we would expect states to be more likely to enact unilateral regulations, as they 
will have a disproportionate influence on government policies.100 
Second, the costs to the regulating state of enacting and enforcing the 
unilateral regulation must be sufficiently low.101 One particularly important cost is 
associated with international law. If a well-established and generally accepted rule 
of international law prohibits states from unilaterally asserting power over foreign 
corporations in a certain manner, states will face considerable barriers to acting. 
Many large, wealthy states—such as the U.S. or many countries in the E.U.—have 
incorporated international law into their own domestic law, thereby escalating the 
costs of non-compliance.102 And many small, developing states fear reprisals from 
                                                 
97  See Hathaway & Shapiro, supra note 9, at 1942–62 (discussing extant theories on why states enter 
into human rights treaties); William Phelan, The ECHR as a Self-Enforcing, Cost-Imposing, Reciprocal 
Human Rights Regime Between Established Democracies (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the author) 
(providing a domestic politics theory of why states enter into costly human rights regimes). 
98  Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, International Economic Law, ‘Public Reason,’ and Multilevel Governance of 
Interdependent Public Goods, 14 J. INT’L ECON. L. 23, 38–40 (2011) (arguing that corporate social 
responsibility may be a public good that is in the reasonable self-interest of all citizens and states); 
Larry Catá Backer, Multinational Corporations, Transnational Law: The United Nations' Norms on the 
Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations as a Harbinger of Corporate Social Responsibility in International 
Law, 37 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 287, 288 (2006). 
99  See Snidal, supra note 95, at 579. 
100  This is a familiar dynamic in international trade law. Countries often impose tariffs on sensitive 
domestic industries from other countries, in order to put pressure on foreign governments to 
change their practices. See Daryl J. Levinson, Collective Sanctions, 56 STAN. L. REV. 345, 400 (2003); 
Rachel Brewster, The Surprising Benefits to Developing Countries of Linking Trade and Intellectual Property, 
12 CHI. J. INT’L L. 1, 45 (2011). 
101  See Snidal, supra note 95, at 598–602. 
102  In other words, where international law has been incorporated into domestic law, actors that violate 
behavioral norms face domestic enforcement and penalties, not just international ones. For a 
description of the ways in which international law is incorporated into domestic law, see Carlos M. 
Vazquez, Customary International Law as U.S. Law: A Critique of the Revisionist and Intermediate Positions 
and a Defense of the Modern Position, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1495 (2011) (discussing the status of 
international law under U.S. law); THE EUROPEANISATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE STATUS 
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE EU AND ITS MEMBER STATES (Jan Wouters, Andre Nollkaemper, 
& Erika de Wet, eds., 2008) (discussing the same under the laws of the E.U. and its members). On 
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larger trading partners for violating international law in a way deleterious to the 
interests of those partners.103 
Although international law does not always provide strong constraints on 
state action,104 and, in many cases, its dictates are either ambiguous105 or 
contentious,106 it does establish some limits on what paths states can take to 
regulate behavior beyond their borders. These limits can be usefully classified as 
procedural and substantive. 
The most important procedural rule that international law imposes on states 
in this context is a jurisdictional hurdle.107 In order for states to be able to regulate 
foreign corporations directly, they must have jurisdiction (1) to proscribe the 
regulated behavior and (2) to enforce the regulation against the particular 
defendant or property.108 These jurisdictional hurdles are generally met when the 
corporation is a national of the regulating state or is located within the territory of 
                                                 
the other hand, the role of international law in the U.S. system is fraught and contentious, so it may 
not always effectively constrain U.S. lawmakers. See David H. Moore, Constitutional Commitment to 
International Law Compliance?, 102 VA. L. REV. 367, 445 (2016). 
103  Industries in developing countries often depend heavily on access to foreign markets. At least in 
the context of the WTO, any violation of such international trade agreements can lead to such 
access being restricted. But see Brewster, supra note 100, at 1 (describing the increasing power of 
developing countries to sanction violations of international trade by developed countries). 
104  See Nico Krisch, Weak as Constraint, Strong as Tool: The Place of International Law in U.S. Foreign Policy, 
in UNILATERALISM AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 41 (David M. 
Malon & Yuen Foong Khong eds., 2003); W. Michael Reisman, Unilateral Action and the 
Transformations of the World Constitutive Process: The Special Problem of Humanitarian Intervention, 11 EUR. 
J. INT'L L. 3, 3 (2000); Philippe Sands, American Unilateralism, 96 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 85, 89 
(2002). 
105  See Hersch Lauterpacht, Codification and Development of International Law, 49 AM. J. INT'L L. 16, 19 
(1955) (“[T]he absence of agreed rules partaking of a reasonable degree of certainty is a serious 
challenge to the legal nature of what goes by the name of international law.”). See also George 
Norman & Joel P. Trachtman, The Customary International Law Game, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 541, 548 & 
n. 34 (2005); Jonathan Remy Nash, Essay, Standing and the Precautionary Principle, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 
494, 500 (2008). 
106  See JOHN F. MURPHY, THE EVOLVING DIMENSIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: HARD CHOICES FOR 
THE WORLD COMMUNITY 12–55 (2010) (discussing the various sources of disagreement between 
states on the content of international law). 
107  International law rules of jurisdiction are generally a matter of customary international law. See 
CEDRIC RYNGAERT, JURISDICTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 21–22 (2008); Vaughan Lowe, 
Jurisdiction, in INTERNATIONAL LAW 335, 341–42 (Malcom D. Evans ed., 2006). As such, they may 
be expected to suffer from vagueness- and legitimacy-related problems. On the other hand, many 
states have incorporated these rules into domestic frameworks, and thus they have a strong effect 
on state behavior. See Jordan J. Paust, Federal Jurisdiction over Extraterritorial Acts of Terrorism and 
Nonimmunity for Foreign Violators of International Law under the FSIA and the Act of State Doctrine, 23 VA. 
J. INT’L L. 191, 191–92 (1983). 
108  See International Bar Association, Report of the IBA Task Force on Extraterritorial Jurisdiction 7–8 (2009) 
[hereinafter IBA Report]; Sarah H. Cleveland, Essay, Embedded International Law and the Constitution 
Abroad, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 225, 231–32 (2010). 
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the regulating state.109 However, if neither of these conditions is true, the state 
must rely on some other, potentially controversial, basis for jurisdiction. These 
include the “effects test,” under which a state may assert jurisdiction over actions 
that have effects within the territory of the state,110 and the “protective principle,” 
under which a state may regulate extraterritorial conduct that “is directed against 
the security of the state or against a limited class of other state interests.”111 The 
essential point here is that, as the nexus between the regulating state and the 
regulated corporation or activity decreases, the acceptable bases of jurisdiction 
under international law decrease as well.112 This requirement substantially limits a 
state’s ability to regulate foreign corporations. 
In addition to procedural limits on a state’s ability to enact unilateral 
regulations, international law also places substantive limits on how states can treat 
foreign corporations.113 For example, international law places strict limits on a 
state’s ability to expropriate the property of foreign nationals and requires 
compensation for certain inequitable treatment.114 In addition, the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) provides a comprehensive set of rules governing 
international trade.115 These rules, binding on all 164 member-states, generally 
                                                 
109  Nationality-based and territoriality-based jurisdiction are widely known as acceptable rationales for 
state regulation. See John H. Knox, A Presumption Against Extrajurisdictionality, 104 AM. J. INT’L L. 
351, 355–61 (2010). 
110  See IBA Report, supra note 108, at 12. 
111  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 402(3) (1987). 
112  In addition, customary international law prohibits states from exercising jurisdiction over actions 
outside their borders when doing so would be “unreasonable,” an open-ended inquiry that supports 
the general position that international law imposes limits on aggressive extraterritoriality. See 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 403(1). 
113  The issue of corporate rights under international law is a controversial one. Traditionally, states 
were the sole subjects of international law, and some scholars argue that corporations have no rights 
under international law unless explicitly granted them under treaties or national law. See Julian G. 
Ku, The Limits of Corporate Rights Under International Law, 12 CHI. J. INT’L L. 729, 732 (2012). Others 
argue that corporations may benefit from international legal rules, including human rights treaties. 
See MARIUS EMBERLAND, THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF COMPANIES: EXPLORING THE STRUCTURE OF 
ECHR PROTECTION (2006); Lucien J. Dhooge, Human Rights for Transnational Corporations, 16 J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 197, 200 (2007); Michael K. Addo, The Corporation as Victim of Human Rights 
Violations, in HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS AND THE RESPONSIBILITY OF TRANSNATIONAL 
CORPORATIONS 187 (Michael K. Addo ed., 1999). For the purposes of this article, it is unnecessary 
to pursue this debate, as some international treaties (such as investment treaties) undisputedly do 
regulate the manner in which states may treat foreign corporations. 
114  Campbell McLachlan et al., INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT ARBITRATION: SUBSTANTIVE 
PRINCIPLES ¶ 8.03 (Loukas Mistelis et al. eds., 2007). 
115  The WTO is an exception in the world of multinational organizations in that it has an internal 
tribunal, the Dispute Settlement Body, with a well-developed jurisprudence and a history of high 
compliance rates with its decisions. As such, violation of its rules can entail significant costs for the 
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require governments to tax and regulate imported and locally-produced goods 
equally (the national treatment requirement)116 and to extend any advantages 
granted to products from one member state to products from all other member 
states (the most favored nation requirement).117 States are also subject to an 
increasing number of bilateral investment treaties (BITs), in which they guarantee 
that they will treat foreign investment from certain corporations in certain ways—
for example, many BITs include clauses guaranteeing “fair and equitable 
treatment” to foreign investment.118 
But even lawful unilateral corporate regulations may be costly to states. If 
the regulation requires significant monitoring costs—such as active policing or 
intrusive investigative work—in order to achieve its purpose, then the likelihood 
of unilateral regulation is reduced. So, for example, if the only way for a state to 
enforce carbon emissions laws on foreign corporations is to monitor factories 
around the world, then the cost of the regulation may exceed its benefits to the 
regulating state. Similarly, if the very enactment of unilateral regulation creates 
costs for the regulating state, by, for example, generating conflict with other 
countries, the likelihood of regulation will decrease.119 A state must consider the 
consequences of enacting regulations on relationships with other states and what 
their potential responses might be. If boomerang regulation, in which opposing 
countries enact harmful regulation aimed at the regulating state, is both expected 
and harmful to domestic interests, then unilateral regulation becomes more 
difficult.120 
                                                 
non-compliant state. See Warren F. Schwartz & Alan O. Sykes, The Economic Structure of Renegotiation 
and Dispute Resolution in the World Trade Organization, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S179, S200-03 (2002). 
116  General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. III(4), Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 
[hereinafter GATT] (“The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the 
territory of any other contracting party shall be accorded treatment no less favourable than that 
accorded to like products of national origin in respect of all laws, regulations and requirements 
affecting their internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use.”). 
117  GATT art. I(1) (“With respect to customs duties and charges of any kind imposed on or in 
connection with importation or exportation . . . any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity 
granted by any contracting party to any product originating in or destined for any other country 
shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined for 
the territories of all other contracting parties.”). 
118  See U.S. Dep’t of State, 2004 Model BIT, art. 5(1), available at https://perma.cc/XV9C-8ZDB; 
Anthea Roberts, Clash of Paradigms: Actors and Analogies Shaping the Investment Treaty System, 107 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 45, 50 (2013); Benedict Kingsbury & Stephan Schill, Investor-State Arbitration as Governance: 
Fair and Equitable Treatment, Proportionality and the Emerging Global Administrative Law (2009), available 
at https://perma.cc/K2C5-TWMH. 
119  See Bradford & Ben-Shahar, supra note 9, at 400–01. 
120  See Nico Krisch, From Consent to Consultation: International Law in an Age of Global Public Goods 12 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
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Of course, there may be ways for states to reduce the costs of unilateral 
corporate regulation. Monetary sanctions have proved to be a particularly 
powerful tool to offset the expense of monitoring and enforcing corporate rules. 
Settlements from the DOJ’s foreign corruption unit, for example, accounted for 
almost half of the entire Criminal Division’s $2 billion in penalties in 2010.121 
Foreign asset freezes similarly can involve large sums.122 These regulatory 
recoveries can act as a kind of tax on other countries for the regulating state’s 
provision of the good in question, reducing the costs of the unilateral action.123 
As this discussion makes clear, an important feature of unilateral corporate 
regulation is that the assessment of costs and benefits occurs on a unilateral basis. 
That is, the regulating state assesses the costs and benefits of regulating 
international business without any direct consideration of wider costs and benefits 
to other countries. This, of course, may be problematic from the perspective of 
global welfare: if the costs of unilateral regulation fall primarily on the regulating 
state but the benefits accrue more broadly, we might expect an under supply of 
corporate regulation. Therefore, even if unilateral regulation is desirable from the 
perspective of global welfare, it might not be enacted. Conversely, even if 
unilateral regulation is not desirable from the perspective of global welfare, it might 
still be enacted. The consequences of this dichotomy will be discussed further 
below. 
2. State power. 
In addition to an interest in unilateral regulation, a state must also have the 
ability to engage in it. Ultimately, this means that the regulating state must be able 
to change the payoff structure to corporations of engaging in the regulated 
behavior. Thus, the regulating state must have some way of imposing costs on 
foreign corporations. The assertion of regulatory power is moot, after all, if 
foreign corporations have nothing at stake. 
Often, it is quite easy for states to impose costs on foreign corporations. To 
the extent that foreign companies are present in the regulating state, either by 
having branches, employees, or assets located within the country, the state can 
plausibly threaten to sanction acts of non-compliance by the foreign corporation. 
So, the U.S. requires foreign companies located within its borders to pay tax on 
                                                 
121  See Christopher M. Matthews & Joe Palazzolo, Jury Clears Two Businessmen in “Sting” Case on Bribery, 
WALL ST. J., Jan. 31, 2012, at B3, available at http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142405297020
3920204577193322932194432. 
122  It has been estimated that Libya’s frozen assets amounted to $170 billion. See Evan Criddle, 
Humanitarian Financial Intervention 2 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
123  See Snidal, supra note 95, at 598–602. 
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U.S.-based income.124 If a corporation declines to pay this tax, the U.S. can seize 
the foreign corporation’s assets in order to recover the assessed tax. As long as 
the class of corporations that are subject to the regulation are located within the 
territory of the regulating state, unilateral regulation is a simple matter. This sort 
of direct regulation is plausible for a wide range of states because it only requires 
the ability to reach domestically-located entities. 
The imposition of costs on foreign corporations becomes more difficult, 
though, if the corporations are not located within the territory of the regulating 
state and merely sell products or services into the territory. In this case, there may 
be no assets in local banks to seize or employees to arrest. As a consequence, the 
ability of states to regulate corporations unilaterally is limited. In such cases, states 
have sometimes conditioned market access on compliance with local regulations. 
So, for example, states often require imported foods to meet certain health and 
safety requirements in order to enter the domestic marketplace.125 Similarly, if 
corporations wish to sell stocks or bonds in the U.S., these products must comply 
with U.S. securities regulations.126 These sorts of regulations are, in essence, a 
carrot to foreign corporations—if they comply with the unilateral regulation, they 
will have access to the regulating state’s market. The attractiveness of the carrot, 
of course, will depend on the size and nature of the regulating state’s market.127 
But what if the relevant corporations are neither located in the regulating 
state nor sell products into it? This situation is the most problematic for states 
                                                 
124  It also requires domestic companies to pay tax on worldwide income, that is, income earned in any 
country. The effects of this tax on the behavior of domestic companies have been discussed at great 
length, but are largely irrelevant for the purposes of this article. See generally, for example, Charles E. 
McLure Jr., Legislative, Judicial, Soft Law, and Cooperative Approaches to Harmonizing Corporate Income Taxes 
in the US and the EU, 14 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 377 (2008); ROSANNE ALTSHULER, ET AL., LESSONS THE 
UNITED STATES CAN LEARN FROM OTHER COUNTRIES’ TERRITORIAL SYSTEMS FOR TAXING 
INCOME OF MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS (2015). 
125 But even in this area, states have limited discretion to enact health requirements for imported foods. 
The WTO places significant limits on the way that states can pass such laws. See Andrew T. 
Guzman, Introduction—International Regulatory Harmonization, 3 CHI. J. INT’L L. 271, 273 (2002). 
126  For an analysis of the variety of laws applicable to foreign issuers, see Christopher Hung Nie Woo, 
United States Securities Regulation and Foreign Private Issuers: Lessons from the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 48 AM. 
BUS. L. J. 119, 129–34 (2011); Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, Portable Reciprocity: Rethinking 
the International Reach of Securities Regulation, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 903, 922 (1998); John C. Coffee, Jr., 
Racing Towards the Top?: The Impact of Cross-Listings and Stock Market Competition on International Corporate 
Governance, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1757, 1823 (2002). 
127  Again, market access restrictions may run afoul of international law. The European Treaty, for 
example, requires the removal of most market access restrictions between member states. See 
Gareth Davies, Understanding Market Access: Exploring the Economic Rationality of Different Conceptions of 
Free Movement Law, 11 GERMAN L.J. 671, 673 (2010). For a discussion of the importance of asset 
location and market access on extraterritorial jurisdiction, see William S. Dodge, The Structural Rules 
of Transnational Law, 97 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 317, 318 (2003); William S. Dodge, Antitrust and 
the Draft Hague Judgments Convention, 32 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 363, 364 (2001). 
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interested in regulating international business. The regulated corporation or 
product has little or no nexus to the regulating country, and therefore 
jurisdictional problems are pronounced. Just as importantly, even if jurisdictional 
issues can be overcome, the regulating state must find some way to enforce 
sanctions, either directly or indirectly, on the foreign corporations. Some states 
may have no ability to do so, and thus unilateral regulation becomes impossible. 
Others might be able to put indirect pressure on foreign corporations through 
sanctions targeted at other actors that do have ties to the country, including, 
potentially, the home country of the foreign corporation.128 In any case, the 
options available to countries in these situations are limited, and many countries 
will have no ability to impose unilateral regulations under these circumstances. 
B.  Types of Unilateral Regulation  
States have attempted to regulate and constrain international corporations 
through a variety of unilateral actions. This Section will distinguish between three 
generic types of international regulation: corporation-level regulation, product-
level regulation, and country-level regulation. The regulatory categories are 
distinguished by the direct target of the sanctions, whether it be corporate 
behavior abroad, products entering the country, or statewide activity. Of course, 
the ultimate target in each of these cases is corporate behavior, but the methods 
for reaching this behavior can differ significantly from case to case. 
1. Corporation-level regulation. 
The first type of regulation is direct, corporation-level regulation. 
Corporation-level regulation refers to regulation that is targeted at the corporate 
entity itself and its behavior. It is to be distinguished from more targeted, product-
level regulation and less targeted, country-level regulation.129 Corporation-level 
                                                 
128  One area in which this has occurred is Section 301 actions in the U.S., which authorized the U.S. 
president to take unilateral action against countries that failed to protect U.S. intellectual property. 
See Myles Getlan, TRIPS and the Future of Section 301: A Comparative Study in Trade Dispute Resolution, 
34 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 173, 179 (1996). See also Alan O. Sykes, Constructive Unilateral Threats in 
International Commercial Relations: The Limited Case for Section 301, 23 L. & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 263, 316–
17 (1992). The use of Section 301 has largely been curtailed after several members of the WTO 
challenged its legality. See Edward Lee, Measuring TRIPS Compliance and Defiance: The WTO Compliance 
Scorecard, 18 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 401, 406–407 (2011). 
129  It should be noted at the outset that the three types of unilateral regulation may shade into one 
another. That is, regulation targeted at a corporation’s products (such as health and safety 
requirements) may also in a sense be targeted at the corporation, as it requires corporations to 
behave in certain ways. Similarly, product-level regulation may be similar to country-level regulation 
where products from certain countries are prohibited or regulated in a special manner. This typology 
aims to characterize the function and underlying motives of unilateral regulation. However, because 
of the complexity of such legislation—particularly in the number of actors and elements that may 
provide the impetus for any particular regulation—it is not possible to establish mutually exclusive 
categories. Instead, these categories should be thought of as points along a continuum. 
Chicago Journal of International Law 
 550 Vol. 17 No. 2 
regulation is the kind of regulation that we typically think of when we refer to 
extraterritorial corporate laws: it is regulation that requires corporations, even 
foreign corporations, to behave in certain ways and threatens sanctions for non-
compliance. 
Corporation-level regulation generally takes the following form. A country 
perceives an interest in regulating corporations in a certain way, such as 
prohibiting them from engaging in anti-competitive behavior. Domestic 
corporations argue that complying with the regulation will impose costs on them 
that foreign corporations do not face, and thus will place them at a competitive 
disadvantage with respect to companies from other countries that have not 
enacted regulation. Recognizing this situation, the regulating state extends the law 
to cover behavior by foreign corporations as well as domestic corporations. The 
result is unilateral corporate regulation—regulation that is aimed at global 
corporate behavior. 
Corporation-level regulation is the simplest and most direct form of 
unilateral corporate regulation. Examples of it abound, from anti-corruption 
legislation130 to antitrust regulation131 to secondary sanctions,132 all of which reach 
extraterritorial behavior by foreign corporations. Despite the prevalence of 
unilateral corporation-level regulation, such efforts to regulate the behavior of 
foreign corporations abroad have often met stiff resistance from other 
countries.133 Whenever a government threatens to, or actually does, prosecute or 
otherwise sanction a foreign corporation, there is the risk of conflicting 
governmental interests. So, one government might have an interest in prohibiting 
the reproduction of patented medicines without the authorization of the patent-
holder, but another country might have an interest in promoting the production 
of cheap, generic AIDS vaccines.134 Even absent malicious motives, these two 
government policies can lead to conflict if one government prosecutes foreign 
                                                 
130  See Magnuson, supra note 11, at 394 (arguing that the FCPA has been enforced aggressively against 
foreign corporations and thus represents an attempt at unilateral corporate anti-bribery regulation). 
131  Joseph P. Griffin, Extraterritoriality in U.S. and EU Antitrust Enforcement, 67 ANTITRUST L.J. 159, 159 
(1999) (discussing efforts by the U.S. and the E.U to enforce competition laws on foreign 
corporations in order to protect domestic markets and consumers). 
132  Secondary sanctions refer to efforts by a regulating state to prevent foreign corporations from doing 
business with a sanctioned state. See Harry L. Clark, Dealing with U.S. Extraterritorial Sanctions and 
Foreign Countermeasures, 20 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 61, 63–64 (1999) (discussing U.S. efforts to 
induce foreign corporations to abide by U.S. sanctions against third countries, such as Cuba and 
Iran). 
133  See Developments in the Law—Extraterritoriality, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1226, 1246 (2011) (describing the 
generally negative reaction of other countries to U.S. assertions of extraterritorial jurisdiction). 
134  See Graham Dutfield, Delivering Drugs to the Poor: Will the TRIPS Amendment Help?, 34 AM. J.L. & MED. 
107, 121 (2008); Robert Bird & Daniel R. Cahoy, The Impact of Compulsory Licensing on Foreign Direct 
Investment: A Collective Bargaining Approach, 45 AM. BUS. L.J. 283, 283–84 (2008). 
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corporations in the other country for reproducing AIDS vaccines without the 
permission of the patent-holder. Unilateral corporation-level regulation also runs 
into sovereignty-related problems, as the question can arise why the regulating 
state has any interest in regulating the behavior of foreign corporations in foreign 
lands.135 
Of course, unilateral corporation-level regulation is not always resisted by 
other governments. In many cases, foreign governments may not have the tools 
to regulate the behavior at issue. In such instances, unilateral regulation by a 
different government that is able to monitor corporate behavior and enforce 
robust corporate laws may be welcomed by the home government. There is some 
evidence that a number of governments have in essence outsourced corporate 
regulation to powerful countries.136 When unilateral corporation-level regulation 
is viewed as beneficial by other countries, it can be an especially effective solution 
to the problems of corporate agility, as it directly imposes costs on foreign 
companies regardless of where they are located. 
One prominent example of corporation-level regulation is the Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), which takes aim at corporate bribery abroad. The 
U.S. enacted the FCPA in 1977 after the Watergate investigations had uncovered 
the widespread use of slush funds by corporations to bribe foreign officials.137 The 
FCPA prohibited U.S. companies from making payments, either directly or 
indirectly, to foreign officials in order to obtain business.138 
U.S. companies immediately complained about the competitive disadvantage 
the FCPA imposed on them and began to press for an international agreement on 
corruption.139 Although progress on an international treaty was halting and 
                                                 
135  The cultural imperialism critique has often been levied against U.S. anti-bribery norms. See Steven 
R. Salbu, Extraterritorial Restriction of Bribery: A Premature Evocation of the Normative Global Village, 24 
YALE J. INT'L L. 223, 253–54 (1999). 
136  See Magnuson, supra note 8, at 866 (describing efforts by Israel, Columbia, and Mexico to outsource 
certain elements of law enforcement to the U.S.). 
137  See, for example, James Sterngold, Kakuei Tanaka, 75, Ex-Premier and Political Force in Japan, Dies, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 17, 1993, at B14. 
138  15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a). The FCPA criminalizes only the giving of bribes, not the receiving of them, 
and thus does not prohibit foreign officials from accepting bribes. See United States v. Castle, 925 
F.2d 831, 835 (5th Cir. 1991) (describing the “overwhelming evidence of Congressional intent to 
exempt foreign officials from prosecution for receiving bribes, especially since Congress knew it 
had the power to reach foreign officials in many cases, and yet declined to exercise that power”). 
139  See Hongying Wang & James N. Rosenau, Transparency International and Corruption as an Issue of Global 
Governance, 7 GLOB. GOVERNANCE 25, 41 (2001). Anti-bribery norms appear to be sufficiently 
“sticky” to make it unlikely for legislators to repeal legislation once it is in place. See Kenneth W. 
Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Values and Interests: International Legalization in the Fight Against Corruption, 
31 J. LEGAL STUD. S141, S162 (2002); Daniel K. Tarullo, The Limits of Institutional Design: Implementing 
the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 665, 675 (2004). 
Chicago Journal of International Law 
 552 Vol. 17 No. 2 
sporadic, the U.S. succeeded in convincing other countries to sign the OECD 
Anti-Bribery Convention in 1997.140 Yet, despite the promise of a level playing 
field, countries failed to enforce their obligations under the Convention 
rigorously,141 leading many commentators to observe that American companies 
still faced a competitive disadvantage.142 
In recent years, however, the U.S. has begun to alter its enforcement strategy. 
Most importantly, the SEC and the DOJ have begun to prosecute foreign 
corporations at a much higher rate than previously.143 In doing so, the agencies 
have asserted aggressive theories of extraterritorial jurisdiction, basing jurisdiction 
on such minimal contacts with the U.S. as a “telephone call to the United States, 
a letter mailed to the United States, the use of air or road travel, or the clearing of 
a check or wire transfer of funds through a financial institution in the United 
States.”144 The U.S. has, in effect, asserted a power to regulate bribery globally, 
regardless of the nationality of the corporation or its effects in the U.S. This 
corporation-level regulation has led to a number of large settlements with foreign 
corporations and has forced many corporations to change the way they operate.145 
                                                 
140  Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business 
Transactions, Dec. 17, 1997, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-43 (entered into force Feb. 13, 1999) 
(hereinafter, OECD Anti-Bribery Convention). 
141  Between 2000 and 2010, U.S. enforcement actions outnumbered foreign enforcement actions by 
more than 3.5 to 1. Trace Global Enforcement Report 2011, TRACE INTERNATIONAL, at 1, 4 (2011), 
https://perma.cc/Z6ZG-YU9R. 
142  They argue that the U.S. enforces the FCPA rigorously against its own corporations, while other 
countries do not enforce their anti-corruption laws against their corporations. As a result, U.S. 
corporations cannot bribe foreign officials to win government favor, while foreign corporations 
can. Tarullo, supra note 139, at 683; Rachel Brewster, Stepping Stone or Stumbling Block: Incrementalism 
and National Climate Change Legislation, 28 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 245, 308–10 (2010). 
143  Non-U.S. companies have paid eight of the ten largest US settlements for FCPA violations. See 
Kimberly A. Parker, Anti-Corruption Enforcement: Trends and Analysis 2010–2011, in WHITE COLLAR 
CRIME 2011: PROSECUTORS AND REGULATORS SPEAK 390 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice, Course 
Handbook Series No. 28257, 2011). In 2010, foreign corporations accounted for 94% of the total 
penalties paid by corporations for FCPA violations. See FCPA Digest of Cases and Review Releases 
Relating to Bribes to Foreign Officials under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Shearman & Sterling 
LLP, at vi (Jan. 2011), https://perma.cc/4KE6-LC4R. In 2011, foreign corporations accounted for 
91% of DOJ fines for FCPA violations. See DOJ Enforcement of the FCPA – Year in Review, FCPA 
PROFESSOR (Jan. 11, 2012), https://perma.cc/N4UF-6JQ3. 
144  H. Lowell Brown, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Under the 1998 Amendments to the Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act: Does the Government’s Reach Now Exceed Its Grasp?, 26 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 239, 359 
(2001). One might query whether such contacts are sufficient to comply with the international law 
rules regulating extraterritorial jurisdiction. See discussion supra Section II.A.1. 
145  Examples include the adoption of anti-corruption compliance programs and the retention of 
independent compliance monitors. See Lucinda A. Low et al., Enforcement of the FCPA in the United 
States: Trends and Effects of International Standards, in THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 2008: 
COPING WITH HEIGHTENED ENFORCEMENT RISKS 711, 716 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice, Course 
Handbook Series No. 13908, 2008). 
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The unilateral approach appears to have worked moderately well in inducing 
foreign corporations, or at least foreign corporations with substantial ties to the 
U.S., to enact anti-bribery compliance programs. It has also encouraged other 
countries to enforce their own anti-bribery laws.146 It is unclear, however, whether 
this effect will be durable, as at least some corporations have indicated a desire to 
avoid U.S. jurisdiction because of the costs associated with FCPA compliance.147 
2. Product-level regulation. 
An alternative approach to corporation-level regulation for states seeking to 
constrain the behavior of foreign corporations is product-level regulation.148 
Product-level regulation is more targeted than corporation-level regulation, as it 
does not aim to constrain corporate behavior generally. Instead, it requires 
products sold into the regulating country to meet certain standards of 
production—they must possess certain characteristics or have been made in 
certain ways. Thus, the regulating state does not purport to impose restrictions on 
the worldwide behavior of corporations, but merely regulates the bringing of 
goods into the country. One example of product-level regulation is the imposition 
of carbon taxes on imported products.149 
                                                 
146  See Sarah C. Kaczmarek & Abraham L. Newman, The Long Arm of the Law: Extraterritoriality and the 
National Implementation of Foreign Bribery Legislation, 65 INT’L ORG. 745, 745 (2011) (finding that 
countries that had their corporations targeted by the FCPA were more likely to enforce their own 
national anti-bribery laws). 
147  Four companies have delisted their stocks from the New York Stock Exchange shortly after settling 
FCPA prosecutions. See Thomas Gorman & William McGrath, The New Era of FCPA Enforcement: 
Focus on Individuals and Calls for Reform, SEC ACTIONS BLOG (Aug. 31, 2011), 
https://perma.cc/XWJ3-4275. In addition, at least 60 companies delisted securities from U.S. 
exchanges between 2007 and 2011 as a result of the high administrative, regulatory and other costs. 
See Comm. on Int’l Bus. Trans., The FCPA and Its Impact on International Business Transactions: Should 
Anything Be Done to Minimize the Consequences of the U.S.’s Unique Position on Combating Offshore 
Corruption? 21 (Dec. 2011), https://perma.cc/H6H6-M3LD [hereinafter, IBT Report]. It is 
impossible to know how many corporations have decided not to list their securities at all in order 
to avoid being subject to the requirements of the FCPA. 
148  This Section will focus on incoming product-level regulation, that is, the imposition of requirements 
on products brought into the regulating state. Product-level regulation also takes the form of 
outgoing regulation. An example of outgoing product-level regulation is arms export legislation, 
which prohibits or restricts the export of certain items, including dual-use items, with military 
applications. See AARON XAVIER FELLMETH, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 
TRANSACTIONS 269–307 (2011). Although outgoing product-level regulation is often aimed at 
prohibiting domestic companies from exporting products, it is another way in which states can 
attempt to regulate the behavior of international corporations, by making it more difficult or costly 
for such corporations to behave in certain ways. 
149  See Doaa Abdel Motaal, “Emissions Offshoring”: Repercussions for International Trade, 5 CARBON & 
CLIMATE L. REV. 466, 466–67 (2011). 
Chicago Journal of International Law 
 554 Vol. 17 No. 2 
Product-level regulation is often aimed at the production process itself. For 
example, a country might require that imported tuna be caught using dolphin-
friendly nets150 or that imported textiles not be made by child workers.151 These 
kinds of product-level regulations resemble corporation-level regulation, as they 
refer to corporate behavior as opposed to product quality. They are, however, 
distinguished from corporation-level regulation because they do not require 
corporations to behave in certain ways or face civil or criminal punishment. They 
merely require incoming products to have been produced in certain ways before 
entering domestic markets.152 
Product-level regulation has the potential to be more targeted and, therefore, 
less controversial than corporation-level regulation. By focusing on a product, 
product-level regulation is more territorially restricted than corporation-level 
regulation. As such, unilateral regulation in this form falls more squarely within 
the limits of international jurisdictional rules and may generate less policy conflict 
with other governments. As mentioned earlier, a country’s jurisdiction to regulate 
corporations and products within its territory is undisputed. 
Product-level regulation is not, however, entirely free of dispute. It imposes 
costs on foreign corporations and thus may be resisted by the corporations or 
their home governments. Perhaps more importantly, import restrictions are 
heavily constrained by international agreements. The WTO requires its Member 
States to remove most import restrictions and only allows exceptions in limited 
circumstances.153 Thus, to the extent that states have mutually agreed to refrain 
                                                 
150  The U.S. enacted a similar law in 1988, prohibiting the import of tuna from countries that lacked 
laws and kill rates comparable to those of the U.S. When other countries challenged the embargo 
as a violation of the GATT, the GATT panel opinion stated that the U.S. had violated international 
trade law. The embargo eventually was lifted after an international agreement on the subject. See 
Richard W. Parker, The Use and Abuse of Trade Leverage to Protect the Global Commons: What We Can 
Learn from the Tuna-Dolphin Conflict, 12 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 11–13 (1999). 
151  There is some debate about whether import restrictions on products created using child labor would 
withstand WTO scrutiny. See, for example, Daniel S. Ehrenberg, The Labor Link: Applying the 
International Trading System to Enforce Violations of Forced and Child Labor, 20 YALE J. INT'L L. 361, 416 
(1995); Matthew C. Bazzano, Child Labor: What the United States and Its Corporations Can Do to Eliminate 
Its Use, 18 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 200, 216–17 (1996). 
152  Of course, an import prohibition is, in a sense, a form of punishment, as it imposes a cost on the 
corporation. This characteristic, however, is common to all forms of unilateral corporate regulation: 
it aims to make certain behavior more costly corporations, even foreign ones. 
153  GATT Article XI states that “[n]o prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other 
charges, whether made effective through quotas, import or export licences or other measures, shall 
be instituted or maintained by any contracting party on the importation of any product of the 
territory of any other contracting party or on the exportation or sale for export of any product 
destined for the territory of any other contracting party.” GATT, supra note 116, at art. XI. Article 
XX provides a list of exceptions to this requirement, including measures “necessary to protect 
public morals,” “necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health,” and “relating to the 
conservation of exhaustible natural resources.” Id. at art. XX. 
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from using import restrictions, they may be prohibited from instituting certain 
kinds of product-level regulation unilaterally. Thus, ironically, while product-level 
regulation is the most targeted form of unilateral regulation and might naturally 
be viewed as the least controversial, it is in fact more heavily constrained by 
international law than corporation-level regulation.154 
One important area of product-level enforcement is securities regulation. 
The internationalization of securities trading in recent years has raised a dilemma 
for government regulators who want to ensure the efficiency, fairness, and 
competitiveness of their capital markets.155 Although governments desire to attract 
securities trading to their markets, they also want to protect investors from 
securities fraud. But strong investor protections can potentially deter companies 
from listing their securities on domestic exchanges.156 While there is a growing 
effort to achieve greater cooperation between securities regulators,157 sharp 
differences in the level and nature of antifraud protections remain.158 
                                                 
154  This peculiar situation may be explained by the fact that countries have been more successful in 
negotiating multilateral agreements on trade and less successful in negotiating multilateral 
agreements on other corporate activities. 
155  See David Bach & Abraham L. Newman, Transgovernmental Networks and Domestic Policy Convergence: 
Evidence from Insider Trading Regulation, 64 INT’L ORG. 505, 520 (2010). 
156  See Amir N. Licht, Games Commissions Play: 2x2 Games of International Securities Regulation, 24 YALE J. 
INT’L L. 61, 64 (1999). For a discussion of the roots of this regulatory competition and the pressure 
for “light touch” regulation, see John C. Coffee, Jr., System Risk After Dodd-Frank: Contingent Capital 
and the Need for Regulatory Strategies Beyond Oversight, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 795, 818–22 (2011). Some 
scholars, however, have noted that stricter regulation will attract foreign companies to domestic 
exchanges, as companies attempt to bond themselves to the regime’s high standards. See Jeffrey N. 
Gordon, Ties that Bond: Dual Class Common Stock and the Problem of Shareholder Choice, 76 CAL. L. REV. 
1, 3 (1988). Some empirical studies, however, have argued that the bonding effect is weak. See Jordan 
Siegel, Can Foreign Firms Bond Themselves Effectively by Renting U.S. Securities Laws?, 75 J. FIN. ECON. 
319, 321 (2005). 
157  The International Organization of Securities Commissions, an association of securities regulators 
from over 100 countries, has led efforts to harmonize disclosure requirements between 
jurisdictions. It has improved information-sharing among regulators, but has largely failed to make 
progress on accounting standards convergence. See David Zaring, Finding Legal Principle in Global 
Financial Regulation, 52 VA. J. INT’L L. 683, 699 (2012). 
158  The U.S. has negotiated with other countries to promote insider trading laws, but other countries, 
even if they agree to legislative changes, often are slow to make enforcement changes. For example, 
Japan prohibits insider trading, but the penalties for violations are based on the commission earned 
by those trading on the news, not the profits from the trade. Penalties proposed last year for 
violations were as low as $630. See Muddy Waters: The Deep Roots of Insider Trading, ECONOMIST (June 
16, 2012), https://perma.cc/RDD5-XWTW. See also Merritt B. Fox, Securities Disclosure in a 
Globalizing Market: Who Should Regulate Whom, 95 MICH. L. REV. 2498, 2503 (1997) (concluding that 
regulatory competition would lead to a race to the bottom). But see Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. 
Guzman, Portable Reciprocity: Rethinking the International Reach of Securities Regulation, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 
903, 916 (1998) (arguing that regulatory competition between regimes on securities regulation would 
be beneficial). 
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The U.S. has responded to these dynamics with strong product-level 
regulation.159 First, Section 5 of the Securities Act requires all issuers of securities 
to file a registration statement containing various disclosures, thereby insuring that 
all investors have access to basic information about the corporation’s securities.160 
Section 5, however, only applies to offers and sales of securities that make use of 
interstate commerce.161 Second, Rule 10b-5 makes it unlawful for any person to 
defraud or deceive purchasers of securities.162 Rule 10b-5 only applies, however, 
if the deceptive conduct was “in connection with the purchase or sale of any 
security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so 
registered.”163 Although there was some ambiguity about the extraterritorial reach 
of this anti-fraud rule, the U.S. Supreme Court has clarified that the rule focuses 
“not upon the place where the deception originated, but upon purchases and sales 
of securities in the United States.”164 In other words, the anti-fraud protections of 
the U.S. securities laws do not regulate deceptive practices generally by 
international corporations. It is only when the securities product is bought or sold 
within the U.S. that the U.S. asserts a regulatory interest in it.165 
The U.S., thus, has enacted unilateral product-level regulation to prevent the 
harms of securities fraud. It regulates securities when they “enter” the U.S., 
regardless of the source of those securities. It requires disclosures about those 
                                                 
159  A large literature has developed around the international effects of U.S. securities law. See generally, 
for example, Choi & Guzman, supra note 158; Stavros Gadinis, The Politics of Competition in International 
Financial Regulation, 49 HARV. INT’L L.J. 447 (2008); Joel P. Trachtman, Unilateralism, Bilateralism, 
Regionalism, Multilateralism, and Functionalism: A Comparison With Reference to Securities Regulation, 4 
TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 69 (1994); Beth A. Simmons, The International Politics of 
Harmonization: The Case of Capital Market Regulation, 55 INT’L ORG. 589 (2001). 
160  Securities Act of 1933 § 5(a), 15 U.S.C.A. § 77e (West 2012). 
161  Id. at § 77e(a). The SEC has issued regulations providing a safe harbor for sales that are made 
abroad. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.901-904 (2011). 
162  17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2011). 
163  15 U.S.C. § 78j(b). See SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 820 (2002). 
164  Morrison v. Nat’l Australian Bank, 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2884 (2010). In Morrison v. National Australian 
Bank, the Supreme Court held that Section 10(b), and thus Rule 10b-5, do not apply 
extraterritorially. Id. at 2883. 
165  After the Morrison decision, some commentators worried that U.S. anti-fraud provisions were too 
limited in their application. The 2008 Dodd-Frank Act granted the SEC jurisdiction to enforce the 
anti-fraud provisions of the Exchange Act to transactions that involve “any conduct within the 
United States that constitutes significant steps in furtherance of the violation, even if the violation 
is committed by a foreign adviser and involves only foreign investors; or (2) conduct occurring 
outside the United States that has a foreseeable substantial effect within the United States.’’ Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 
§ 929P (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5301 et seq.). On the other hand, some courts have held that, 
at least for private suits, U.S. investors who purchase securities overseas do not receive the 
protection of Rule 10b-5. See SEC, Study on the Cross-Border Scope of the Private Right of Action Under 
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, at 34, (Apr. 2012), https://perma.cc/P7R8-D5ZF. 
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securities to meet certain standards of accuracy and completeness. Unilateral 
product-level regulation is facilitated by the dominance of U.S. markets and the 
ease of monitoring behavior.166 This dominance has allowed the U.S. to resist 
pressure to forego strong investor protections.167 
3. Country-level regulation. 
Finally, unilateral corporate regulation may take the form of country-level 
regulation. Country-level regulation is less targeted than either product-level 
regulation or corporation-level regulation, as it sanctions the home country of 
international corporations, rather than the relevant corporation or its goods. In 
this sense, country-level regulation is the least direct of all potential unilateral 
forms of regulation. Instead of imposing costs directly on the corporation or its 
products, it aims to constrain corporate behavior by putting pressure on the 
corporation’s home government. An example of country-level regulation is the 
suspension or withdrawal of trade concessions or aid grants in response to 
intellectual property violations by corporations located in a country.168 
Country-level regulation is generally enacted when a regulating state views 
the problematic corporate behavior as widespread within a single country and 
sufficiently important to require broad-based retaliatory action. Often, it involves 
a perceived lack of adequate laws, or lack of enforcement of those laws, in the 
foreign country. For example, the U.S. has initiated sanctions against Japan for 
allegedly unfair business practices by Japanese film companies (and, in particular, 
Fuji).169 The aim of country-level sanctions is to incentivize foreign governments 
to induce their corporations to behave differently. 
Country-level regulation as a response to corporate agility offers a number 
of advantages over more targeted regulation. First, country-level regulation can 
                                                 
166  It is less clear whether this will continue to be the case in the future. On a number of measures, the 
relative attractiveness and competitiveness of U.S. capital markets is declining. See Comm. on 
Capital Mkts. Regulation, The Competitive Position of the U.S. Public Equity Market 1 (2007), 
https://perma.cc/MS4E-T29C. Some scholars, however, have noted that foreign companies may 
be attracted to the U.S. as a way of bonding themselves to better corporate governance standards. 
See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future as History: The Prospects for Global Convergence and Its Implications, 93 
NW. U. L. REV. 641, 651–52 (1999). 
167  See Simmons, supra note 159, at 601 (“[I]f the dominant financial center is large and competitive 
enough, it seems utterly arbitrary to assume that it will sacrifice its national regulatory preferences 
to engage in a downward competitive spiral with foreign jurisdictions.”). 
168  The U.S. threatened monetary sanctions against Thailand and China in the 1990s in response to 
what was perceived as rampant IP violations by companies in those countries. These threats 
eventually led both countries to change their IP laws to provide better protection for U.S. 
companies. See Getlan, supra note 128, at 191–99. 
169  See generally John Linarelli, The Role of Dispute Settlement in World Trade Law: Some Lessons from the Kodak-
Fuji Dispute, 31 L. & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 263 (2000). 
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leverage the influence of powerful domestic interests in foreign countries to 
achieve corporate change. Country-level regulations sometimes affect industries 
other than the ultimate target of the regulation, and, indeed, often directly aim at 
unrelated industries.170 By imposing costs on more powerful or influential 
domestic actors, country-level regulations can be more effective at incentivizing 
foreign governments to take action. For example, sanctions on the automobile 
industry in the U.S. or the agriculture industry in France would fit the bill. 
Second, country-level regulation does not need to identify with particularity 
the specific corporations that are engaging in the prohibited behavior. Instead, it 
identifies a general problem or practice in a country and imposes sanctions based 
on this general problem. This approach reduces the investigative costs involved 
with targeting particular companies and avoids the problem of corporations 
merely shifting business to alternate entities. Thus, country-level regulation takes 
advantage of asymmetric information and monitoring capabilities in foreign 
countries.171 In many cases, the regulating state is not in the best position to 
monitor and enforce corporate regulations, such as when the relevant behavior is 
difficult to observe without a domestic presence. Instead, by putting pressure on 
foreign governments to change the way they regulate corporations, country-level 
regulation can encourage regulatory agencies with better monitoring abilities to 
enforce the desired laws. 
At the same time, country-level regulation is, by its very nature, conflict-
inducing. At a minimum, it involves economic sanctions (either through 
reductions in aid or through increases in trade barriers) on a country-wide basis. 
Often, it involves targeting influential and important actors in a foreign country. 
At the extreme, it can lead to trade wars. These sorts of conflicts will likely 
dissuade countries from initiating country-level regulations except in situations of 
widespread harm. 
Similarly, one of the primary strategies of country-level regulation, the 
suspension or withdrawal of trade concessions, is costly both to the regulated state 
and the regulating state.172 The most effective sanctions will likely be the most costly 
                                                 
170  See Jide Nzelibe, The Credibility Imperative: The Political Dynamics of Retaliation in the World Trade 
Organization’s Dispute Resolution Mechanism, 6 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 215, 224 (2005) (“[I]f retaliation 
targets a wide range of industries, mobilization will be difficult because of free-rider problems. 
Therefore, the injured state has an incentive to engage in targeted retaliation and focus on a discrete 
group of powerful industries that it believes will put sufficient pressure on politicians in the scofflaw 
state.”). 
171  See Kalypso Nicolaodis, Mutual Recognition of Regulatory Regimes: Some Lessons and Prospects (Jean 
Monnet Working Paper No. 7/97, 1997), https://perma.cc/45C4-EPRD (analyzing the benefits of 
cooperation between different domestic regulators). 
172  It is widely accepted among trade scholars that lower barriers to trade are beneficial for most 
countries in most circumstances. Thus, to the extent that a country raises its trade barriers in an 
effort to impose costs on international corporations, it is a costly measure for the regulating state, 
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ones. The purpose of sanctions is to impose sufficient costs on a foreign 
government so as to incentivize the foreign government to constrain the behavior 
of its corporations. But in many cases, foreign governments will not be willing to 
act unless the cost of inaction is high. In order to increase the cost of inaction, the 
regulating state must increase either the level or the breadth of economic 
sanctions. Either of these measures will increase the cost of sanctions to the 
regulating state.173 
Finally, country-level regulations are heavily regulated under international 
trade law. The WTO prohibits states from enacting country-specific trade barriers 
except in special circumstances, such as when a country is engaging in dumping 
or otherwise violating international trade law.174 If a country enacts country-level 
regulation in violation of WTO law, it is subject to sanctions under the WTO 
dispute settlement body.175 Such sanctions can greatly increase the cost of 
unilateral regulation. For these reasons, most governments use country-level 
regulation sparingly, if at all. 
One significant area of country-level regulation is intellectual property.176 
Intellectual property protection is a multi-faceted problem for corporations and 
governments because the producers of intellectual property (such as the 
pharmaceutical industry, the recording industry, and the film industry) desire to 
realize profits from both domestic and international sales of their products. But 
corporations abroad often have an interest in piggybacking on the intellectual 
property created by other corporations in order to avoid devoting resources to 
research and development. If a country does not enact (and, importantly, enforce) 
laws protecting the IP rights of foreign corporations, then its own corporations 
may be able to operate at an advantage over their competitors. These issues are 
complicated by the fact that some countries are net intellectual property 
                                                 
even if the measure is seen as largely in the long-term interest of the state. See Guzman, supra note 
42, at 595; JAGDISH BHAGWATI, IN DEFENSE OF GLOBALIZATION 280–81 (2007). 
173  An alternative way to increase the perceived cost to foreign governments is to target politically 
influential industries, such as steel in the U.S. or agriculture in Europe. As already mentioned, this 
approach may make unilateral regulation more effective without greatly increasing its cost. 
174  See Mark Wu, Antidumping in Asia’s Emerging Giants, 53 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 3 (2012). 
175  There is some question about the efficacy of WTO sanctions, which are generally prospective and 
do not allow for the recovery of past damages. See Rachel Brewster, The Remedy Gap: Institutional 
Design, Retaliation, and Trade Law Enforcement, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 102, 102 (2011). 
176  See Alan O. Sykes, supra note 128, at 264–65; Brewster, supra note 98, at 2–3; NITSAN CHOREV, 
REMAKING U.S. TRADE POLICY: FROM PROTECTIONISM TO GLOBALIZATION 155 (2007); Peter 
Drahos, Negotiating Intellectual Property Rights: Between Coercion and Dialogue, in GLOBAL INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY RIGHTS: KNOWLEDGE, ACCESS AND DEVELOPMENT 161, 171 (Peter Drahos & Ruth 
Mayne eds., 2002); BERNARD M. HOEKMAN & MICHEL M. KOSTECKI, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY 
OF THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: FROM GATT TO WTO 147 (1995); Alan O. Sykes, TRIPS, 
Pharmaceuticals, Developing Countries, and the Doha “Solution”, 3 CHI. J. INT’L L. 47, 47–48 (2002). 
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producers, and others are net intellectual property users.177 Thus, the content of 
international property rules will have distributional consequences, as the adoption 
of a high level of protection for producers of intellectual property will be a net 
gain for producer-countries and a net loss for consumer-countries.178 This 
dynamic has hindered international negotiations over an international intellectual 
property agreement. 
Despite these obstacles, states have managed to negotiate a number of 
international agreements on the protection of intellectual property rights,179 the 
most important of which is the WTO’s Trade Related Intellectual Property 
Agreement (TRIPS). TRIPS obligates its members to establish minimum 
standards of IP protection under national law and create enforceable IP rights 
even for foreign IP owners.180 TRIPS has not, however, solved international 
intellectual property problems, and a number of IP-dependent industries (such as 
the pharmaceutical industry and the software industry) have complained that 
countries are failing to enforce their IP laws adequately.181 
As a response, the U.S. has used the threat of unilateral country-level 
sanctions to prevent corporations abroad from violating the rights of U.S. IP 
owners. The primary statute in this area is Section 301, a law that permits the 
president to use a broad array of measures against a country if the country engages 
in “unfair” trade practices, which include a lack of “adequate and effective 
protection of intellectual property rights.”182 Sanctions can include reductions in 
aid, the suspension of trade concessions, or the creation of other import 
restrictions.183 Notably, the statute specifies that the government may take action 
against any goods from the foreign country, without regard to whether the goods 
are connected to the targeted behavior.184 In 1998, the U.S. used Section 301 to 
                                                 
177  In general, developed countries are more likely to be producers of intellectual property than 
developing countries. See Arvind Subramanian & Jayashree Watal, Can TRIPS Serve As An 
Enforcement Device for Developing Countries in the WTO?, 3 J. INT'L ECON. L. 403, 404 (2000). 
178  See Brewster, supra note 100, at 15. 
179  Prominent examples include the U.N.-created World Intellectual Property Organization, the Berne 
Convention, and the Paris Convention. 
180  See Patricia L. Judd, Toward a TRIPS Truce, 32 MICH. J. INT’L L. 613, 622 (2011). 
181  See David Leonhardt, The Real Problem with China, N.Y. TIMES, Jan 17, 2011, at B1; Press Release, 
Sec’y Timothy Geithner, The Path Ahead for the U.S.-China Economic Relationship (Jan. 12, 2011), 
https://perma.cc/3JWF-NKP3; Brewster, supra note 103, at 1. 
182  19 U.S.C. § 2411(d)(3)(B)(i). Section 301 also includes a provision, which is often referred to as 
“Special 301,” that specifically addresses intellectual property. See Judith H. Bello & Alan F. Holmer, 
“Special 301”: Its Requirements, Implementation, and Significance, 13 FORD. INT’L L.J. 259, 259 (1990). This 
section will not distinguish between Section 301 and its subpart Special 301. 
183  19 U.S.C. § 2411(c)(1). 
184  19 U.S.C. § 2411(c)(3)(B). 
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impose import restrictions on Brazil and threatened to do the same to India in 
response to corporate violations of IP rights, particularly in the area of 
pharmaceuticals.185 
This unilateral approach to international IP protection, however, faced 
strong resistance by other countries, which objected to the U.S.’s assertion of a 
right to unilaterally assess the adequacy of other countries’ IP law. In 1998, the 
E.U. challenged Section 301 under the WTO’s dispute settlement mechanisms.186 
Although the WTO panel found that Section 301 did not violate the terms of the 
WTO Agreement, it noted that this determination was based in part on the U.S. 
president’s undertaking that all future Section 301 determinations would be made 
pursuant to WTO decisions.187 Thus, the prospects for unilateral use of Section 
301 have been significantly constrained by WTO law. 
Still, the U.S. maintains a watch list of countries that are concerns for IP 
protection and may institute sanctions for actions that do not constitute violations 
of WTO duties.188 In 2001, the United States Trade Representative (USTR) raised 
customs duties on products from Ukraine and suspended trade preferences to the 
country in response to rampant violations of U.S. IP rights in optical media, such 
as CDs and DVDs.189 Ukraine later amended its copyright laws and increased 
enforcement against domestic corporations.190 The U.S., thus, still implicitly, and 
sometimes explicitly, threatens unilateral action to prevent foreign corporations 
from misappropriating corporate intellectual property.191 
The U.S. approach towards protecting the intellectual property of U.S. 
corporations illustrates some of the advantages and disadvantages of unilateral 
country-level regulation. First, Section 301 has permitted the U.S. to reach 
corporate behavior exhibiting little nexus to U.S. territory. Much of the intellectual 
property behavior that is problematic is located entirely within the borders of a 
                                                 
185  See HOEKMAN & KOSTECKI, supra note 176, at 279. 
186  See generally Panel Report, United States–Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974, P. 8.1, WTO 
Doc. WT/DS152/R (Dec. 22, 1999). 
187  See id. at 329–30. 
188  The list currently includes a number of countries, including Argentina, China, Russia, and Thailand. 
Office of the U.S. Trade Rep., 2012 Special 301 Report (Apr. 2012). 
189  See FELLMETH, supra note 188, at 522. 
190  See id. at 522. 
191  It is important to point out here that the U.S. is not pursuing unilateralism to the exclusion of 
multilateralism. One prominent example of the U.S.’s efforts to gain greater multilateral agreement 
regarding the protection of intellectual property is the Trans-Pacific Partnership. See Kevin 
Granville, The Trans-Pacific Partnership, Explained, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 20, 2016), 
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/business/tpp-explained-what-is-trans-pacific-
partnership.html?_r=0. But the backlash against that treaty only highlights the drawbacks and 
limitations of multilateralism in today’s world. 
Chicago Journal of International Law 
 562 Vol. 17 No. 2 
foreign country, and thus is outside the jurisdiction of U.S. law. Second, the U.S. 
has used Section 301 to reach corporations that would otherwise avoid regulation. 
One of the major problems in regulating intellectual property is that violations are 
often difficult to detect. Corporations may know that their IP is being pirated or 
used illegally, but they often do not know the identities of the violators.192 Even if 
they do identify the violators, the costs of individual prosecutions may outweigh 
the benefits of shutting down individual violators. By imposing costs on a country-
wide basis, the U.S. incentivizes foreign countries to regulate the behavior of their 
own corporations.193 Third, the U.S. assertion of unilateral regulatory power has 
run up against international trade agreements, as it potentially violates the terms 
of the WTO. Thus, U.S. discretion has been cabined by international law. At the 
same time, the U.S. still has the ability to withhold aid, as opposed to imposing 
trade restrictions, in order to pressure foreign countries to monitor their 
corporations. It is unclear to what extent this carrot has been used, although U.S. 
corporations routinely request government help in preventing the misuse of their 
intellectual property.194 
C. The Effectiveness of Unilateral  Regulation 
When a decision has been made to take unilateral action, states have a 
number of options at their disposal: they can adopt corporation-level regulation, 
product-level regulation, country-level regulation, or any combination of these 
approaches. In addition, each approach itself can involve a multitude of decisions: 
what behavior to target, which corporations to regulate, what sanctions to mete 
out, and many other related questions. Given the complexity of unilateral 
regulation, the effectiveness of particular approaches will likely be contingent on 
a number of complex factors. This Section will provide some preliminary 
observations on the matter. 
The principal determinant of effectiveness is the extent to which a state can 
impose costs or bestow benefits on foreign corporations, and the cost of such 
                                                 
192  See Brewster, supra note 103, at 33. 
193  See Kaczmarek & Newman, supra note 146, at 745. 
194  In a 2009 cable from the Algerian embassy entitled “E-Barbary Coast: Profits and Piracy in the 
Algerian Software Market,” the State Department addressed the problem of piracy and its effects 
on U.S. business. The cable focused on the complaints of Microsoft that its software was being 
used without authorization by numerous companies. Microsoft representatives told the State 
Department that it was losing $20m a year due to software piracy and that 80% of small- and 
medium-sized enterprises were illegally using Microsoft programs. Microsoft requested that the 
State Department take “more forceful action regarding Algerian IPR protection” in order to ensure 
that the Algerian government enforced its IP laws against infringers. Cable #09ALGIERS302_a, 
09ALGIERS228, Wikileaks (Mar. 29, 2009, 16:33 UTC), https://perma.cc/BU72-CZXA. Algeria 
remains on the Section 301 priority watch list. 
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impositions or bestowals to the regulating state.195 If a country can greatly decrease 
the profits of a foreign corporation through a simple and low-cost measure, then 
domestic regulatory action is likely to be effective. But if legislation is expensive 
to the state, or a corporation can easily avoid the legislation,196 then unilateral 
efforts grow more difficult.197 
A number of factors may affect the costs and benefits of particular forms of 
unilateral regulation. This Section will focus on three factors: (1) the nature of the 
harm, (2) the importance of the regulated behavior to corporations, and (3) the 
type of actors involved. These factors are by no means comprehensive, but they 
are transversal and can provide substantial insight into the effectiveness of 
unilateral corporate regulation. 
First, the effectiveness of unilateral regulation depends on the nature of the 
harm being regulated. In some circumstances, the harm stems from the manner 
in which a product is produced. For example, countries have often expressed an 
interest in prohibiting the use of child labor, even when the product of such labor 
is identical to products made using adult labor.198 In other circumstances, the harm 
may be unconnected to any product but rather stem from business practices 
abroad, such as anti-competitive behavior or bribery. 
Product-level regulation depends on the importation into or the presence 
within the regulating state of goods or services. Thus, it is most effective when 
the harm that is being regulated is related to the tangible or intangible presence of 
                                                 
195  This Article is agnostic on the debate between rational choice scholars and constructivist scholars 
about the decisionmaking processes of state actors. There is a large literature discussing whether 
state actors rationally balance the costs and benefits of state policies to maximize social welfare, and 
even what it means to act “rationally.” See KEOHANE, supra note 23; Kenneth W. Abbott, Enriching 
Rational Choice Institutionalism for the Study of International Law, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 5, 10 (2008); Daryl 
J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the Allocation of Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 345, 348–54 (2000). This article will not address that debate. Instead, for the purposes of 
this article, I will merely assume that state decisionmakers perceive costs and benefits of regulations, 
and that these perceptions affect the decisionmaker’s actions. 
196  The cost here includes long-term harm to a corporation’s reputation. It may be easy for a 
corporation to ignore human rights laws, but if having a reputation for violating human rights hurts 
a company’s bottom line, then that is a cost that corporations should take into account. See generally, 
for example, Kevin T. Jackson, Global Corporate Governance: Soft Law and Reputational Accountability, 35 
BROOK. J. INT’L L. 41 (2010); Tim Bartley & Curtis Child, Shaming the Corporation: Reputation, 
Globalization, and the Dynamics of Anti-Corporate Movements (Aug. 7, 2011) (unpublished manuscript) 
(on file with author). 
197  An important point here is that the interests of foreign governments are not directly relevant to the 
analysis. They may, of course, affect the perceived costs and benefits of the regulating state, but 
only in an indirect way. Indeed, this is one of the essential features of unilateral regulation, as it 
involves a single state’s decision as opposed to an agreed-upon solution involving multiple states. 
Thus, unilateral regulations may well impose externalities on other states that are not fully taken 
into account by the regulating state. 
198  See Shima Baradaran & Stephanie Barclay, Fair Trade and Child Labor, 43 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 
1, 6–8 (2011). 
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a good within a country. Where the harm, however, stems from anti-competitive 
behavior abroad and does not involve products imported into the regulating state, 
then the effectiveness of product-level regulation is hindered. For example, if the 
regulated corporation has monopolized a foreign market, but does not import 
goods into the regulating state, then product-level regulation may be ineffective at 
imposing costs on the relevant corporations. Corporation-level regulation, aimed 
at the behavior abroad regardless of the importation of goods, may be more 
effective in these circumstances. But again, it relies on the ability of the regulating 
state to impose civil or criminal liability on the regulated corporations. If 
corporations are located abroad and do not have assets in the regulating state, then 
corporation-level regulation may fall short as well. In these circumstances, 
countries may be forced to adopt country-level unilateral regulations. 
A second important factor in assessing the effectiveness of unilateral 
corporation regulation is the importance of the regulated behavior to 
corporations. The question here is whether the regulated behavior is sufficiently 
important to companies as to outweigh the cost of complying with the regulation. 
Product-level regulations are most effective when market access to the regulating 
state is essential to the operations of the regulated corporations. So, for example, 
if the U.S. passes a law that requires all imported cars to have steering wheels in 
the middle of the car, then it is likely that foreign carmakers will re-engineer their 
cars to comply with the new regulation, as long as the U.S. market is sufficiently 
important to their business. If, on the other hand, North Korea passes the same 
regulation, carmakers likely will not respond in the same way. Corporation-level 
regulation similarly is most effective when the prohibited behavior is unimportant 
to the corporation and corporations receive great benefits from maintaining a 
presence (either in the form of headquarters, bank accounts, or stock listings) in 
the regulated state. 
Country-level regulation operates in a more indirect manner. The unilateral 
regulation may well target actors other than the corporations at issue, in order to 
exert greater pressure on foreign governments to change the behavior of their 
corporations. Thus, to a certain extent, the effectiveness of the regulation depends 
on the importance of particular behavior both to the target corporations that are 
the ultimate aim of the regulation and to the corporations whose operations or 
exports are directly affected by the regulation. 
Third, the type of actors involved will heavily influence the effectiveness of 
unilateral corporate regulation. The relevant actors in this context are the 
regulating state, the target state, and the target corporations. Is the target 
corporation a large company or a small one, an export dependent one or a 
primarily in-country producer, a multinational company or a national one? Is the 
regulating state a large state or a small state, a wealthy state or a poor one, a 
developed country or a developing one, a capital-exporting country or a capital-
importing one? Similar questions can be asked about the target state as well. The 
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nature of the regulator and the regulated is important because it conditions the 
kinds of costs that the regulator can impose on the regulated. 
To take just one example, the U.S. has a perhaps unrivaled ability to regulate 
international business unilaterally.199 The attractiveness of U.S. capital markets,200 
the size and wealth of the U.S. consumer market,201 the power of the U.S. dollar,202 
and the power of New York banks203 all contribute to the ability of U.S. 
                                                 
199  The E.U., considered as a single unit, may have a comparable ability to regulate corporations 
internationally. See Bradford, supra note 14, at 5 (arguing that the E.U. “has become the predominant 
regulator of global commerce”). The E.U. has a bigger economy than the U.S., it has more Fortune 
500 companies, and it attracts more investment. See Bernd Debusmann, Who Wins in U.S. vs. Europe 
Contest?, REUTERS (Feb. 12, 2010), https://perma.cc/EPV9-BBM5. While Britain’s departure from 
the E.U. will certainly reduce the E.U.’s market power, it remains to be seen whether Brexit will 
dramatically change the E.U.’s aggressive unilateralism in areas such as tax and antitrust. See, for 
example, Corporate Taxation: The €13 Billion Bite, ECONOMIST (Sept. 3, 2016), 
https://perma.cc/KV7P-Y97E.; Mark Scott, E.U. Rules Look to Unify Digital Market, But U.S. Sees 
Protectionism, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 13, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/14/technology/eu-
us-tech-google-facebook-apple.html?partner=bloomberg. 
200  The attractiveness of U.S. capital markets is a matter of some debate today. Many scholars have 
argued that over-regulation of listed companies along with the rise of alternative sources of capital 
have contributed to a decline in the competitiveness of U.S. capital markets. See Comm. On Capital 
Mkts. Regulation, Continuing Competitive Weakness in U.S. Capital Markets (2015), 
https://perma.cc/U5MR-VDYK. Others note that the U.S. is still a dominant actor. In 2001, the 
domestic market capitalization of New York Stock Exchange and NASDAQ made up more than 
half of the capitalization of the entire World Federation of Exchanges, and the U.S. share of the 
value of global stock trading was 58%, and in 2005, 2,087 foreign firms had cross-listings in the 
U.S., and foreign listings on the three major exchanges in New York accounted for 30% of total 
global foreign listings. See Craig Doidge, G. Andrew Karolyi & Rene M. Stulz, Has New York Become 
Less Competitive in Global Markets? Evaluating Foreign Listing Choices Over Time, J. FIN. ECON. 91, 253–
277 (2009). At the same time, the relative competitiveness of U.S. markets is falling on a number 
of metrics. See Comm. on Capital Mkts. Regulation, supra note 166. 
201  The importance of market access to the regulating state plays, as mentioned before, an essential 
role in determining the effectiveness of unilateral regulation, and in particular product-level 
regulation. See Thomas Oatley & Robert Nabors, Redistributive Cooperation: Market Failure, Wealth 
Transfers, and the Basle Accord, 52 INT’L ORG. 35, 49–52 (1998) (describing the importance of financial 
market power to U.S. efforts to regulate capital requirements). 
202  More than 35% of international financial transactions are denominated in dollars. The use of U.S. 
dollars in international commerce has greatly expanded the territorial reach of U.S. law, as most 
dollar-denominated transactions must “clear” through a U.S. bank. See Dollar Power, ECONOMIST 
(June 23, 2012), https://perma.cc/G68D-YPUD. While companies can structure their transactions 
in other currencies, the U.S. has used the power of the dollar to affect financial institutions. For 
example, in attempting to sanction Iran’s oil trade, the U.S. has enacted a law that denies access to 
the American banking system to any financial institution that facilitates trades with the Central Bank 
of Iran. See id. For a broader discussion of the efficacy of these efforts and the consequences for 
democratic accountability, see Suzanne Katzenstein, Dollar Unilateralism: The New Frontline of National 
Security, 90 IND. L.J. 293, 293 (2015). 
203  The five largest U.S. banks (JP Morgan Chase & Co., Bank of America Corp., Citigroup, Inc., Wells 
Fargo & Co., and Goldman Sachs Group Inc.) held a combined $8.5 trillion in assets at the end of 
Chicago Journal of International Law 
 566 Vol. 17 No. 2 
policymakers to enact effective unilateral corporate regulations. Companies that 
have stocks listed on a U.S. stock exchange, that sell goods into the U.S., or that 
use U.S. banks for transactions are most vulnerable to U.S. regulation. All of these 
ties between foreign corporations and the U.S. increase the likelihood that the U.S. 
will be able to assert jurisdiction over, and thus impose costs on, foreign 
corporations. 
The nature of the target state may also have an important impact on the 
effectiveness of unilateral corporate regulations.204 To the extent that the 
regulating state opts for country-level regulation, these regulations have the 
potential to cause tensions between the regulating state and target state. If the 
target state is sufficiently powerful to enact retaliatory measures, then country-
level regulations may be too costly to pursue. If, on the other hand, the target state 
relies heavily on the regulating state and does not have the means to enact strong 
countermeasures, then country-level regulations may be more effective. 
This Section has argued that unilateral corporate regulation can serve as a 
feasible substitute for multilateral agreement in many issue areas, as long as there 
is a country with sufficient power that is willing to impose costs on foreign 
companies operating abroad. Individual countries have a number of means at their 
disposal to reach corporate behavior, and these means can provide robust 
constraints on global business. At the same time, unilateral regulation has real risks 
and downsides, and the following Section will outline some ways of avoiding these 
problems. 
IV.  A  FRAMEWORK FOR UNILATERAL 
CORPORATE  REGULATION  
Unilateral corporate regulation can potentially solve, or at least significantly 
mitigate, many of the problems associated with corporate agility today. Large 
economic powers like the U.S. and the E.U. have the means to enforce their laws 
against a wide range of international actors and behaviors. By increasing the 
breadth and scope of domestic laws, and applying them to foreign companies 
operating abroad, states can reduce the anti-competitive effects of enacting 
legislation that imposes costly constraints on corporations. Unilateral corporate 
regulation can be a powerful and effective tool, and states are using it in an 
increasingly aggressive manner. 
At the same time, unilateral regulation is not a panacea, and, in fact, may in 
some circumstances be worse than the problem it is intended to solve. Domestic 
                                                 
2011, an amount equivalent to 56% of the U.S. economy. See David J. Lynch, Banks Seen Dangerous 
Defying Obama’s Too-Big-To-Fail Move, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 16, 2012), https://perma.cc/T4ET-EV55. 
204  Daniel Drezner, for example, has argued that where great powers disagree on the appropriate level 
of regulation, it may lead to regulatory divergence and the emergence of policy convergence at 
multiple nodes. Drezner, supra note 92, at 841. 
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laws at times are blunt instruments that may either deter beneficial behavior or 
encourage harmful behavior. These problems are amplified at the international 
level, as the actions of one state can have reverberating effects on the actions of 
other states. This Section will describe the potential pitfalls of unilateral corporate 
regulation and provide a framework for future efforts. 
A.  The Limits of Unilateral  Corporate Regulation  
Unilateralism is risky. Even if a country can act effectively on its own to 
address a global problem, doing so will not always be welcomed by other 
countries, and indeed may not be the optimal solution to the problem. It is 
important to recognize that the risks are substantial and may provide strong 
reasons for states to forego unilateral action, even where such action is possible. 
First, unilateral regulations carry a high risk of biased enforcement. When 
domestic laws extend to both local and foreign companies, those laws may well 
tend to have harsher consequences for foreign actors, either because of the 
enforcement strategies of prosecutors or the viewpoints of local courts and 
juries.205 Indeed, there is strong evidence that, at least in the U.S., similarly situated 
foreign companies receive significantly higher penalties than domestic ones.206 
Recently, after several British banks were charged with violating money laundering 
statutes in the U.S., a number of British politicians cried foul, asserting that the 
U.S. was attempting to damage the reputation of London as a center of global 
finance.207 While it is difficult to disentangle worthy from unworthy prosecutions, 
the possibility of biased enforcement calls into question whether the regulation is 
serving its stated purpose. 
Second, unilateral regulation can lead to over-regulation. If other countries 
react to one country’s regulation by adopting their own legislation, there is a risk 
of regulatory warfare.208 Of course, this dynamic might lead to optimal 
                                                 
205  The conflicting judgments of U.S. and Korean courts about the patent claims asserted by Apple (a 
U.S. company) and Samsung (a Korean company) against each other give some credence to this 
claim. See Evan Ramstad, Patent Bet Turns Sour for Korean Behemoth, WALL ST. J., Aug. 27, 2012, at B4. 
206  One U.S. study found that foreign corporations pay criminal fines twenty-two times larger than 
those paid by domestic corporations. Brandon L. Garrett, Globalized Corporate Prosecutions, 97 VA. L. 
REV. 1775, 1780 (2011). 
207  In 2012, both Standard Chartered and HSBC, U.K.-based banks, were investigated for evading U.S. 
sanctions on Iran. Standard Chartered paid $340 million to settle with New York regulators, while 
HSBC has set aside $700 million to pay potential fines. U.K. politicians have begun to decry the 
“increasingly anti-British bias” of U.S. regulators and argued that enforcement was “start[ing] to 
shade into protectionism.” Max Colchester, Liz Rappaport, & Damian Paletta, In U.K., A Backlash 
Over Standard Chartered Probe, WALL ST. J., Aug. 8, 2012, at B1. 
208  An alternative, of course, would be for the responding state to react in a different issue area, by, for 
example, refusing to cooperate on other matters of importance to the regulating state. These sorts 
of issue linkages may be particularly prevalent or powerful where the two states interact frequently 
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enforcement, if overlapping regulation by multiple countries is essential to an 
effective regulatory regime. Where, however, national regulators adopt conflicting 
requirements or bring frivolous lawsuits against foreign companies, unilateral 
regulation may deter beneficial corporate behavior and destroy corporate 
efficiencies.209 
Third, for some global problems, unilateral corporate regulation is incapable 
of achieving a durable and complete resolution of the issue. Unilateral regulation 
is a decidedly unstable system and in many instances is effective only over the 
short-term. Unilateral regulation relies on connections with the regulating state—
connections that are easily severed. Companies can close foreign subsidiaries, de-
list, or avoid using financial institutions in the regulating state, and the harmful 
behavior may then leak to regions that are unregulatable. Thus, for certain 
problems, unilateral regulation can only provide a partial solution.210 Furthermore, 
if unilateral regulation is only a partial solution, it may well impede a more 
complete solution if it disperses political pressure for action or complicates 
multilateral negotiations.211 
Fourth, even if unilateral regulation is not biased, is not over-enforced, and 
can provide a durable solution to the relevant problem, it is an exhaustible 
resource: it can only be utilized in a limited number of areas. The implementation 
of unilateral corporate regulation is costly, as it involves legislation, monitoring 
systems, and enforcement mechanisms, each of which requires the devotion of 
political and economic resources. Just as importantly, unilateral regulation 
increases the marginal cost to corporations of being attached to the regulating 
state. As the regulating state’s laws become more burdensome for foreign 
companies, a progressively greater proportion of companies will find the 
advantages of maintaining a corporate presence in the country offset by the costs. 
It may be that the FCPA, FATCA, or Dodd-Frank are not enough to dissuade 
companies from operating in the U.S., but as these regulations proliferate, a 
greater swath of companies will find the U.S. regulatory environment too 
burdensome, too oppressive, or too costly to justify entering the market. The 
                                                 
and deeply, as in the European Union. See Ernst B. Haas, Why Collaborate? Issue-Linkage and 
International Regimes, 32 WORLD POL. 357, 370–75 (1980). 
209  See Richard A. Bierschbach & Alex Stein, Overenforcement, 93 GEO. L. J. 1743, 1744 (2005). 
210  These problems, of course, would also exist with respect to many multilateral agreements. The vast 
majority of international agreements are not unanimously adopted by all nation-states, after all. But 
the costs are likely higher in unilateral regulation, for all the reasons discussed above. 
211  See Rachel Brewster, supra note 142, at 250–68 . On the other hand, unilateral corporate regulation 
may also provide incentives for other states to negotiate seriously in multilateral arenas. For a 
discussion of the ways in which unilateralism can reinforce multilateral agreements and encourage 
treaty compliance (and vice-versa), see Maggie Gardner, Channeling Unilateralism, 56 HARV. INT’L L.J. 
297, 297 (2015). 
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enactment of unilateral corporate regulations in one area, then, may reduce the 
effectiveness of unilateral corporate regulations in others.212 For these reasons, its 
use must be rationed: states need to weigh the importance of particular unilateral 
regulations against the value of other policy priorities. If a regulation will 
significantly decrease the impact of other more important corporate laws, then its 
enactment should be scrutinized more carefully. 
Of course, determining the relative importance of corporate laws is difficult 
and controversial, a fact that raises a further difficulty—the normative quagmire. 
It is likely that our judgments about the desirability of unilateral corporate 
regulation will depend heavily on the substance of the regulation at issue. If we 
believe that the payment of bribes to foreign officials should be criminalized, then 
we will likely look favorably on the FCPA. If we believe that airlines should be 
taxed for their carbon emissions, then we will likely look favorably on the E.U.’s 
Emissions Trading System. If we do not share those beliefs, then unilateral 
regulation begins to look more problematic. When regulation of international 
corporate behavior is based on multilateral agreement, it is probable that at least 
some modicum of broad-based support for the regulation exists. When, instead, 
they are based purely on a unilateral determination by one country, no such 
guarantee exists. Thus, debates about the propriety of unilateral corporate 
regulation risk becoming bogged down in particularized disputes about the 
substantive elements of the regulation. 
All of these difficulties suggest that unilateral corporate regulation should be 
employed selectively and cautiously. There are no simple solutions for any of these 
problems, and unilateral action will likely remain contentious and disputed for the 
foreseeable future. However, the foregoing analysis suggests that a few basic 
principles may help avoid some of the pitfalls of unilateral corporate regulation. 
B.  Rationing Unilateral  Corporate Regulation  
States have a limited capacity to use unilateral regulation to constrain 
corporate behavior. Each assertion of regulatory authority over companies 
operating abroad carries risks and costs, and even the most powerful countries 
face these limitations. Given that states must ration their use of unilateral 
regulation, it is incumbent on policymakers to construct methods for assessing the 
costs and benefits of particular assertions of regulatory authority.213 This Section 
sets forth three criteria that should inform that analysis. 
                                                 
212  See Valentina G. Bruno & Stijn Claessens, Corporate Governance and Regulation: Can There Be Too Much 
of a Good Thing?, 19 J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION 461, 479 (2010). 
213  Of course, conflict of laws and jurisdictional rules may also provide a useful guide for policymakers. 
See Guzman, supra note 6, at 889. These rules, however, merely purport to set out the legal limitations 
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First, states should enact unilateral corporate regulation only when there is a 
global consensus on the nature of the problem. In other words, a government should 
only regulate corporate behavior beyond its borders when that behavior is 
generally accepted in the international community as harmful. If, instead, 
governments have radically different views about the basic value of the behavior, 
then governments should refrain from unilateral regulation.214 For example, given 
the widespread acceptance of corruption as an under-regulated harm, it is 
reasonable for governments to undertake efforts to regulate corruption beyond 
their borders. The same conclusion would be appropriate for climate change.215 
On the other hand, nuclear energy, which provokes heated debate even about 
whether it constitutes a benefit or a harm, is probably best left to domestic 
regulation until a greater consensus develops on its desirability.216 Global 
consensus is important because it indicates both the severity of the problem and 
the desire for action. 
Second, states should use unilateral regulations only when the corporate 
behavior at issue imposes strong externalities on other countries. It is well known 
that when actors do not bear the full cost of their actions, they are more likely to 
engage in socially detrimental behavior.217 Similarly, if a country does not bear the 
full cost of its corporations’ behavior, it is likely to regulate that behavior at a sub-
optimal level. Thus, when corporate behavior in one country imposes externalities 
on other countries, governments in other countries may justifiably regulate that 
behavior. Such regulation is desirable because it attempts to harmonize the 
                                                 
on regulatory authority, not prudential considerations for when a legally permissible action is in fact 
desirable. 
214  One difficulty in assessing global consensus is determining the level of specificity at which 
consensus should be required. For example, countries might agree that child labor is problematic, 
but they might disagree about whether 17-year-olds are children. See, for example, Convention 182 
Concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child 
Labour, adopted June 17, 1999, 2133 U.N.T.S. 161 (entered into force Nov. 19, 2000) (defining a 
child as any person that is less than 18 years old); Convention 138 Concerning Minimum Age for 
Admissions to Employment, adopted June 26, 1973, 1015 U.N.T.S. 297 (entered into force June 19, 
1976) (setting the general minimum age for employment at 15 years). Although there is no easy 
answer to this question, as long as the measure used to regulate the harm has some reasonable 
connection to a harm that is generally recognized as such, then it fulfills this criterion. This 
requirement could also be understood as a litmus test for the level of disagreement on an issue. 
215  For a discussion of the range of unilateral policies that nations have adopted to address climate 
change, see James W. Coleman, Unilateral Climate Regulation, 38 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 87, 87 (2014). 
216  See Mark P. Gibney, The Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Law: The Perversion of Democratic Governance, 
the Reversal of Institutional Roles, and the Imperative of Establishing Normative Principles, 19 B.C. INT’L & 
COMP. L. REV. 297, 305 (1996). 
217  See generally, for example, Steven Shavell, Corrective Taxation Versus Liability as a Solution to the Problem of 
Harmful Externalities, 54 J. L. & ECON. S249 (2011) (discussing ways to allocate the full costs of 
actions to prevent socially detrimental behavior). 
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interests of corporations with the interests of society as a whole. Global warming 
is the paradigmatic example of a problem with strong externalities—carbon 
emissions in one country harm countries everywhere. Thus, unilateral regulation 
to curb climate change would be justifiable under this prong. Purely domestic 
environmental harms, on the other hand, such as soil pollution or contaminants 
in lakes and ponds, would not be fertile ground for unilateral regulation.218 
Finally, when countries decide to act unilaterally, they should adopt the most 
targeted form of unilateral regulation possible. The law, thus, should be as narrowly 
tailored as possible, avoiding effects on either behaviors or actors that do not 
contribute materially to the relevant problem. Tailoring, of course, is important in 
any law because it ensures that the law is: (1) the least costly method of deterring 
bad behavior, and (2) the method that is least likely to deter good behavior.219 But 
tailoring is particularly important in unilateral actions because of the potential for 
international conflict. When countries regulate activities outside their borders, the 
harms from unintentional consequences are amplified: not only are costs imposed 
on corporations that are not citizens of the regulating state, but the political 
ramifications of such regulations can be controversial. Thus, this factor will favor 
adopting product-level regulations over corporation-level regulations, and 
corporation-level regulations over country-level ones. 
These prudential considerations can serve as a guide for determining how 
states should ration their use of unilateral corporate regulation. They will also 
reduce the potential for overlapping and conflicting regulation by multiple 
governments. If applied consistently, they offer the possibility of effective and 
efficient unilateral regulation of global corporate problems. 
V.  CONCLUSION  
It is often said that global problems require global solutions. This Article has 
argued that, contrary to that mantra, many global problems in fact have unilateral 
solutions. And even when they do not have unilateral solutions, governments can 
still act unilaterally to mitigate those problems. Unilateral regulation can serve as a 
powerful restraint on global corporate behavior. At the same time, it is a 
potentially dangerous option, as unilateral regulation risks harming corporations 
with unduly burdensome laws, alienating other governments and impeding future 
                                                 
218  This is not to argue that we should not care about problems with isolated effects. From a global 
welfare perspective, it might be helpful to take into account harms that are only in a foreign country 
(such as free speech or labor standards) if those harms are sufficiently large. It is merely to recognize 
that we have a limited ability to rectify problems abroad, and problems with worldwide effects are 
more likely to create distortions in global governance. 
219  One need only look to the emphasis that the Supreme Court puts on “narrow tailoring” in its strict 
scrutiny jurisprudence to understand the importance that American judges give to adopting targeted 
laws. See Ian Ayres & Sydney Foster, Don’t Tell, Don’t Ask: Narrow Tailoring After Grutter and Gratz, 
85 TEX. L. REV. 517, 518 (2007) (describing the tailoring required in affirmative action programs). 
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cooperation. This Article has suggested some ways to improve and constrain 
unilateral regulation in order to reduce those risks. Ultimately, it is a call for action 
rather than inaction, optimism rather than fatalism, in the effort to resolve the 
increasingly dire problems of the modern world. 
